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Contract Creep 
TAL KASTNER* & ETHAN J. LEIB** 
Scholars and judges think they can address the multiple purposes and 
values of contract law by developing different doctrinal regimes for dif-
ferent transaction types. They think if we develop one track of contract 
doctrine for sophisticated parties and another for consumers, we can 
build a better world of contract: protecting private ordering for sophisti-
cated parties and protecting consumers’ needs all at once. Given the 
growing enthusiasm for laying down these separate tracks and develop-
ing their infrastructures, this Article brings a necessary reality check to 
this endeavor by highlighting for scholars and judges how doctrine in 
contract law functions in fact: it creeps back and forth from track to 
track. Bespoke contract law ends up as general contract law, and law 
designed for one contract ecosystem will almost invariably migrate to a 
different transactional environment. Thus, contract doctrine will be 
applied in a context for which it is not suited, where it may actually 
undermine stated doctrinal goals. 
This Article identifies “creep” from sophisticated party doctrine into 
consumer contract law and from consumer contexts into sophisticated 
party transactions through a few case studies. It then elaborates the mech-
anisms by which creep occurs: porous definitions of transaction types; 
contract drafting practices of standardization with portable provisions 
that confuse courts; and good old common law analogical reasoning that 
involves law jumping from track to track. We conclude by instructing 
judges to be more mindful of the process of contract creep, warning con-
tract drafters to better appreciate the risks and costs of their drafting prac-
tices, and exhorting contract theorists to include the risks and costs of 
creep as they develop their doctrinal edifices, which are likely to be 
applied off-track.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts hearing contract cases sometimes act like they can have at least two dif-
ferent contract law regimes: one for “sophisticated parties” and one for “consumer 
contracts.”1 Much scholarship, reflecting a variety of methodological approaches, 
embraces the idea of a fragmented or otherwise tracked system of contract law to 
facilitate its multiple purposes and values.2 Different types of transactions 
1. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 493, 501–18 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Formalism] (discussing this dichotomy in contract law 
disputes); Meredith R. Miller, Party Sophistication and Value Pluralism in Contract, 29 TOURO L. REV. 
659, 671–72 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Value Pluralism] (same); Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in 
Contracts of Adhesion Trap “Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 251–57 (2010) 
(same); see also Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y. 
1995); Reilley v. Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994); Crane, A.G. v. 206 W. 41st St. Hotel 
Assocs., 87 A.D. 3d 174, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
08 Civ. 11365(RJH), 2010 WL 1257300, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010); Davis & Assocs. v. Health 
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
2. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 8 (2017); 
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419–20 (2004); Alan Schwartz & 
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003); see 
also ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 8 (2009) (noting the need to 
“distinguish business-to-business from business-to-consumer contracts” in analyzing choice-of-law 
policy); Robert E. Scott, The Promise and the Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE 
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privilege distinct contractual goals, such as collaboration, relationship building, 
personal autonomy, community, or efficiency. And these different goals—or sets 
of goals with different priorities—should prompt distinct doctrinal approaches. 
Thus, a tracked or fragmented contract law system that offers a different doctrinal 
regime for each transaction type ideally enables sophisticated parties to engage in 
private ordering, on the one hand, and might protect consumers subject to power 
imbalances that implicate their free choice, on the other. The wisdom of having 
different doctrinal tracks for different transaction types has become widely 
accepted in current scholarship and by judges.3 
However, we argue here that judges and scholars tend to overlook how contract 
doctrines that are developed in one track creep into another and, in doing so, 
threaten to undermine the goals of distinctive tracks. Courts and scholars too of-
ten fail to address the tendency for contract rules developed for sophisticated 
party transactions to migrate into contract law for consumer transactions, and for 
consumer contract regimes to bleed into the contract law for sophisticated trans-
actions. Along the same lines, even within broad transaction types, bespoke prin-
ciples developed in light of specialized areas are susceptible to creeping beyond 
the particular transaction type for which they were designed, potentially compro-
mising the integrity and goals of the tracked system. This blurring of the bounda-
ries between contract regimes cuts at the heart of a premise of a broad swath of 
contract theory. Unstable boundaries threaten the viability of developing distinct 
packages of contract law to pursue different objectives for different kinds of par-
ties with the aim of facilitating efficiency4 and autonomy5 in varied transactional 
contexts.6 
This Article traces a few examples of what we call “creep,” to draw more atten-
tion to the porous boundaries of the contract law for “sophisticated parties” and 
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 107 (Jean 
Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford eds., 2013); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & 
Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
23, 42 (2014) (critiquing the “presumption of the unitary nature of contract law” in light of the 
variegated nature of contract practice); Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and 
Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 QLR 1 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“It is almost 
axiomatic that commercial leases may and should be governed by a different rule than residential 
leases.”); DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at xii (“[E]xisting contract law still offers types that vary 
widely in their normative structures . . . .”); Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (advocating distinct 
interpretive approaches for different transaction types); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 543 
(referencing the “heterogeneity of contractual contexts” prompting a range of normative approaches). 
4. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45 (offering a normative theory of “business 
contracts” to “facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the ‘contractual 
surplus’) from transactions”). 
5. This agenda is most apparent in Dagan and Heller’s so-called “choice theory” in DAGAN & 
HELLER, supra note 2, at 6–7. Dagan and Heller not only base their goal of facilitating autonomy on the 
possibility of identifying distinct contractual types in practice, but also consider the cultivation of 
distinct types an essential means to enable parties to exercise autonomy. 
6. Doctrinal boundary-drawing has also been identified as a challenge with respect to contract 
generally. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989) 
(analyzing the question of doctrinal classification on the boundaries of contract and tort law). 
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the contract law for “consumers.” In doing so, we examine the even-more-unstable 
distinctions within those classifications and on the spectrum between them. We 
also aim to identify some of the mechanisms by which creep occurs both in our 
case studies and more generally. We argue that judges, lawmakers, drafters, and 
contract theorists need to be more sensitive to the way creep works so that their 
approaches do not rely on naı̈ve hopes about the containment of doctrinal elabora-
tions or on misplaced confidence that boilerplate terms will not be cut and pasted 
across transaction types. As we will show, doctrine that looks bespoke for one con-
tractual context often ends up as general contract law—and terms built for special-
ized transaction types can also jump off track and into less appropriate 
transactional environments. As we outline, there are various factors that challenge 
the project of doctrinal containment, including intentional doctrinal expansion by 
courts and lawmakers (to say nothing of possible ideological manipulations), and 
accidental or incidental application of particularized doctrine to a different trans-
actional context. 
Part of the trouble—at least with respect to the most basic two-track model 
between sophisticated parties and consumers—certainly is that judges and con-
tract theorists need to do a better job of fashioning ways to identify “sophisticated 
parties” and “consumers,” for these are not self-defining categories: When a con-
tract law professor signs up for a gym membership, is the professor a consumer 
or a sophisticated party?7 When someone uses social media to promote her work 
with a great deal of computer savvy, is the individual a sophisticated party or a 
mere consumer?8 We are not the first to notice the difficulty that the project of 
defining these categories poses, but we intervene to identify the significance of 
creep as a fundamental challenge to much of contract practice and theory. If these 
categories are used to trigger distinctive interpretive and doctrinal regimes, we 
will need to find better tools to map their boundaries and signal on-ramps onto 
the varied tracks.9 
7. Some courts strongly enforce a “duty to read” against attorneys. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 
F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (enforcing Google’s form contract against an attorney, in part 
because attorneys can be deemed sophisticated, even though there was no evidence that the attorney had 
any expertise about the kind of contract at issue). Others take a more case-by-case approach, evaluating 
whether the lawyer has relevant expertise to qualify as “sophisticated.” See Reilley v. Richards, 632 
N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994) (finding that an attorney with no knowledge of real estate law could not be 
treated as a sophisticated party). 
8. A recent case disposed of this question by noting the degree of sophistication of the consumer 
parties and accordingly holding them bound to the terms and conditions. See Salameno v. Gogo Inc., No. 
16-CV-0487, 2016 WL 4005783, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016) (suggesting a frequent flier’s “apparent 
need for internet access” reasonably qualifies her as sophisticated “internet user” for purposes of 
determining her ability to access terms of use to establish notice and consent); see also Fteja v. 
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“But it is not too much to expect that an 
internet user whose social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly caused him 
mental anguish would understand that the hyperlinked phrase ‘Terms of Use’ is really a sign that says 
‘Click Here for Terms of Use.’”). 
9. See, e.g., Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 518–35 (arguing that courts need to try harder to 
determine sophistication as a matter of fact to trigger special rules for sophisticated parties); 
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But as we show here, blurry specification of party type and transaction type by 
courts and scholars is only one structural cause or mechanism of creep. Another 
traces to drafting realities that gravitate toward standardization and portability of 
clauses.10 The migrating nature of contractual terms from one contract type to 
another creates some difficulty for regime integrity. With migration of terms 
comes messiness about whether interpretations developed in one transaction type 
deserve to be implemented in new transactions in which parties or drafters think 
they can pluck modules off the rack. Moreover, technological and transactional 
innovation also has the potential to make more difficult the identification of doc-
trinal boundaries. Not only do technologies of contract drafting—such as the abil-
ity to cut and paste and to share models widely blur the bounds of context—but 
parties innovate in creating new deal structures and documentation that may 
include models from various sources. Yet, whether parties and drafters always 
intend to incorporate the doctrinal gloss that the words provoke in a different 
transactional context can be difficult to assess. As a result, innovation on various 
dimensions of contract practice can disturb doctrinal boundaries based on trans-
action type. Technologies of legal research can exacerbate the problem: whereas 
treatises, key numbers, or a library’s physical layout once may have helped law-
yers, clerks, and judges focus on important context, the current availability of 
models ripped from context makes it harder to keep doctrinal regimes on track. 
Analogical reasoning in the common law of contract is no doubt also a culprit, 
creating mistaken off-ramps from track to track and continuing to push toward 
uniformity among contract law regimes. Of course, analogical reasoning can also 
be a generative source of innovation within contract law development—so we do 
not come to devalue the cross-fertilization of different tracks, which can lead to 
overall improvements in doctrine.11 But those who promote distinct tracks need 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (acknowledging that the 
rules for standardized contracts do not perfectly work for the class of “sophisticated consumers” who 
will get the benefit of restrictive readings of form contracts that they may not really deserve under the 
Restatement’s rule); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 545 (confronting the doctrinal “boundary issue” 
between sophisticated and consumer party contract law); Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False 
Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 312–13 (2005) (arguing that the category 
of “small businesses” renders the boundaries imperfectly drawn between consumers and merchants in 
contract and commercial law). In another context, Melvin Eisenberg argues that relational contract law 
never fully developed as a separate contract regime largely because it has never been clear how to divide 
the world of relational contracts from the world of discrete transactions. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why 
There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 805, 813 (2000) (“[I]t is impossible to 
locate . . . a definition that adequately distinguishes relational and nonrelational contracts in a legally 
operational way—that is, in a way that carves out a set of special and well-specified relational contracts 
for treatment under a body of special and well-specified rules.”). 
10. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, in 
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 163, 165 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) 
(highlighting the portability of provisions related to recurring contractual issues). 
11. Two examples come to mind. First, consider the way the Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC) 
Articles 1 and 2—governing specialized contract law for the sale of goods—have gravitational pull on 
the common law of contract applicable to contracts outside of the coverage of the UCC, see Peter A. 
Alces & Chris Byrne, Is it Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195, 195 
(2009); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 737, 738–39 
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more critical awareness of the risks of creep so they can understand the interac-
tion effects among the different laws of contract. 
Judges, legislatures, lawyers, and scholars must confront creep because failing 
to do so means they are overlooking a powerful dynamic that can create unin-
tended consequences in purportedly different domains of contract law. They must 
account not only for a potential blurring of lines between contract regimes, but 
also for the migration of doctrine from one regime to another, to which it might 
not be well-suited. Because of the damage that creeping doctrine can wreak on 
the goals and effective functioning of different doctrinal ecosystems, the risk of 
invasive species within delineated areas of contract must be taken more seriously 
as a meaningful cost associated with a fragmented contract law. This cost must be 
considered even if there are also countervailing benefits that can accrue from the 
experimentation of trying old clauses and interpretations and rules in new envi-
ronments.12 Creep is not always bad, nor is it always good, but we need to 
acknowledge it is happening in order to sharpen our cost–benefit analysis, limit 
its impact when it is inappropriate, and celebrate it when it is usefully innovative 
in the way the common law can be at its best. 
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we explore how several theorists 
and judges have embraced the idea of a tracked and fragmented contract law. In 
Part II, we develop a few case studies of the phenomenon of “creep,” demonstrat-
ing that creep goes both ways. In our case study of the enforceability of arbitra-
tions clauses, for example, we are able to show how creep from “sophisticated 
party” transactions ended up as general contract law applied to consumers. By 
contrast, in our case study of contra proferentem—the rule that requires construc-
tion of ambiguous contracts against the drafter—we show how creep can work in 
the other direction, too: seemingly tailored rules for one transactional context to 
help consumers end up applied to sophisticated parties in very different contrac-
tual environments.13 In Part III, we explore three mechanisms, or features, of con-
tract law and its practice that enable creep: category instability concerning both 
(2000), and vice-versa. Courts and scholars acknowledge that different contract law applies to sales of 
goods and sales of services, but there is clearly mutual learning back and forth among the regimes. One 
might say creep here is more or less expected of the common law method, even with the statutory 
character of the UCC, and that this creep might be a productive source of illumination and innovation. 
Similarly, some of the innovations of “relational contract law” have been largely incorporated into the 
general law of contract in part because boundaries between “relational” contracts and “general” 
contracts are hard to spot and in part because the innovations for relational contracts—good faith and the 
relaxation of offer-and-acceptance rules, for example—are thought to be good for contract law more 
generally. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 818–19. 
12. Our discussion of creep and the UCC might be said to be examples of when cross-fertilization 
can lead to net benefits. See supra note 11. Yet there is no excuse for failing to acknowledge and 
evaluate the costs of widespread cross-fertilization as well. And although further work might usefully 
spell out when someone might be able to know in advance when the benefits will outweigh the costs, we 
aim here to draw attention mostly to the costs, so they are not overlooked in the relevant calculus. 
13. Although contra proferentem historically operated as a kind of general contract law before 
becoming more focused as a specialized rule for insurance law, its modern valence and justification are 
most clearly explicated in consumer cases. See generally Joanna McCunn, Contra Proferentem: The 
Chameleon of Contract Law (forthcoming 2019) (tracing the history of the doctrine in the common law). 
1282 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:1277 
party type and transaction type; the modular design of contract documents and 
the portability of terms; and analogical reasoning as a mainstay of the common 
law. We also show how this non-exhaustive collection of features of contract that 
precipitate creep often operate in tandem with one another to exacerbate the blur-
ring of doctrinal regimes. Finally, Part IV is our effort to draw some lessons from 
contract creep. In short, we think lawmakers, lawyers, and scholars need to be 
mindful of the way creep works, so that if they want to continue to have a frag-
mented contract law, they will need clearer criteria for entry into each track and 
better cost–benefit analysis to evaluate how law built for one environment can 
undermine the goals of others. One cannot just will away creep—and lawmakers 
and scholars need to better consider the kinds of downstream unintended costs 
and risks specialized rule design might cause once it creeps off track. 
I. THE FRAGMENTED MODEL 
Explicitly or implicitly, contract scholarship and caselaw reflect a conventional 
understanding that not all transactions are the same nor should they be treated 
that way. It is not news that consumer transactions do not look like “fully negoti-
ated contracts of the classical model.”14 And it is not exactly a new recognition or 
development in contract law that consumer protection has been somewhat par-
celed off from general contract law to better calibrate rules and standards to those 
who, “as a group, . . . have a lower level of sophistication than those with whom 
they typically make contracts.”15 Although there has long been a countermove-
ment toward reviving benchmarks of “party autonomy” even within consumer 
transactions, reinforcing the need for consumers to take responsibility for their 
choices in the market,16 a more recent and concerted effort by law-and-economics- 
influenced contract theorists seeks to concede the distinctiveness of consumer trans-
actions and focus their energy instead on purifying contract law to make it safe and 
efficient primarily for “sophisticated parties.” 
The work of Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott is an exemplar of this focus on 
building and reinforcing a law for sophisticated firms. From the very start of their 
project of orienting contract law and theory toward facilitating parties’ ability to 
maximize joint gains from transactions, they explicitly limit their framework to 
circumstances in which “a firm sells to another firm,” where firms are “sophisti-
cated economic actors.”17 Although they do not deny that individual–individual 
and individual–firm contracts are controlled in part by contract law, they empha-
size family law, real property law, consumer protection law, employment law, 
14. William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between 
“Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (1997). 
15. Id. Woodward dates these developments to the 1930s, and the acceleration of consumer 
protection law to the 1960s. Id. 
16. See id. at 245–46. 
17. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45. Schwartz and Scott define sophisticated parties 
relatively broadly to include corporate entities with at least five employees, limited partnerships, and 
professional partnerships “such as a law or accounting firm.” Id. at 545. 
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and securities law as the primary sources of regulation for these kinds of transac-
tions.18 If pressed, it is hard to believe they would not call the relevant transac-
tions that are not between firms “contracts.” Still, they want “the main subject of 
what is commonly called contract law” to be focused on a law for sophisticated 
parties.19 Indeed, they reinforce the importance of their goal for contract law by 
emphasizing that their doctrinal reform proposals and normative assessments are 
limited only to the “contract type” they put at the center of their work: contracts 
between sophisticated parties, who can “minimize the likelihood of systematic 
cognitive error.”20 They want a “law merchant for our time,” worrying that “rules 
that are appropriate for contracts involving individuals . . . are too frequently 
applied to sophisticated parties.”21 Vic Goldberg’s recent book on contract law 
also focuses especially on a law for sophisticated parties.22 
Even scholars who resist a narrow perspective on contract law limited to so-
phisticated party transactions also implicitly acknowledge the importance of 
differentiating doctrinal tracks. In a recently published book, Hanoch Dagan 
and Michael Heller criticize what they see as an effort to “radically shrink[] the 
scope of contract law” to focus principally on sophisticated parties.23 They aim 
for a “general theory of contract” that can incorporate both the relevance of 
utility to sophisticated parties24— and the relevance of what they call “commu-
nity” in other contract types.25 To their credit, they want the theory and law of 
contract to be more capacious and accommodate more contract types: the 
ambition of the theory is to do a little more “lumping.” Yet their efforts are 
similar enough to other “splitters” because at the center of their perspective on 
contract is the need to have differentiated types that parties can select among: 
they are eager to furnish “the ability to choose from among a sufficient range 
of off-the-shelf, normatively attractive contract types,”26 and some quantum of 
“intra-sphere multiplicity.”27 
For Dagan and Heller, this leads to a fragmented set of tracks for contract law 
itself, while simultaneously being more ambitious about the scope of contract: 
“the application of familiar contract concepts . . . should vary depending on the 
normative concerns driving different contract types.”28 Thus, by bringing, for 
example, employment relations and consumer transactions back into the frame of 
18. See id. at 544. 
19. See id. 
20. Id. at 545–46. 
21. Id. at 550. 
22. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 1 (2015) (“My 
concern, I must emphasize, is with the contracts of sophisticated parties.”). Goldberg defines 
sophisticated party transactions as “agreements for which both parties could be expected to have access 
to counsel.” Id. 
23. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 56. 
24. Id. at 57. 
25. See id. at 58–64. 
26. Id. at 3. 
27. Id. at 6. 
28. Id. at 7. 
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contract law, Dagan and Heller at the same time emphasize that separate rules 
within contract law are necessary to pay respect to context.29 They are not only 
interested in a “two-track model” per se,30 but they return often to a distinction 
between “consumer transactions” and “commercial contracts,”31 with the catego-
ries of “relative sophistication” and “consumer” still doing some meaningful 
work in marking contract types and the legal regimes that ought to apply to 
them.32 Indeed, their conceptual framework depends on distinguishing among 
contractual contexts, and the line between consumer and commercial is ostensi-
bly among the easiest to discern. 
Not only does this fragmented approach make sense in terms of theorizing con-
tract law—as contract law theories have often struggled to reconcile the plural 
values at stake within contract such as autonomy, efficiency, community, reci-
procity, and fairness—but it also resonates in terms of how judges at times 
approach doctrinal rules. There are subtle hints within several doctrinal develop-
ments indicating that courts are edging closer to developing separate bodies of 
law—or at least separate applications to the body of rules—for sophisticated par-
ties on the one hand and consumers on the other, as well as between or within 
these categories. The lack of consistency here causes plenty of confusion,33 and 
scholars are right to remind courts that they probably should be sensitive to differ-
ent values in different contractual contexts. But the law already implicitly 
acknowledges a fragmented model in some respects. 
Consider, for example, the parol evidence rule, which works to exclude certain 
forms of extrinsic evidence when interpreting the text of a final written agree-
ment.34 There is a lot of debate about how best to implement the rule—and how 
to understand courts’ seeming inability to apply the rule consistently and coher-
ently.35 
See Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don’t Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. L. REV. 
93, 95, 98 (1994); David R. Dow, The Confused State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas, 35 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 457 (1994); Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150616; Marie Adornetto Monahan, 
The Disagreement over Agreements: The Conflict in Illinois Regarding the Parol Evidence Rule and 
Contract Interpretation, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687 (2003). 
On the one hand, there is an approach that uses the rule aggressively to 
hew to the text of the agreement. It seeks to exclude as much as possible, with the 
hope that a strong rule incentivizes better drafted final agreements and helps 
29. Id. at 70–72. 
30. For various ways of divvying up the different tracks, see DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 96, 
99. 
31. Id. at 73. Dagan and Heller make a mistake here in calling consumer transactions a “no- 
community” type. See generally Ethan J. Leib, What Is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form 
Contract?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL 
AND THE LYRICAL 259 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford eds., 2013) (describing 
ways consumers have significant ongoing relationships with form contract providers). 
32. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 98–99. 
33. See Ethan J. Leib & Zev J. Eigen, Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction: The Unread and the Undead, 2017 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 65, 67–68. 
34. See generally John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parole Evidence Rule 
and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333 (1967). 
35. 
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courts avoid motivated testimony.36 On the other, there is a more intentionalist 
approach that pursues what the parties really intended given the context. This 
approach admits more extrinsic evidence, with the hope that a less strict rule will 
reduce errors and work against the potential power imbalances that could bias the 
language in the final text of the agreement and bias courts toward presuming the 
final writing is actually integrated.37 Most courts, however, appear somewhat 
inconsistent as to whether they apply a “Willistonian” hard rule or a “Corbinite” 
softer rule.38 
Yet taking account of the status of the parties—specifically whether they are 
sophisticated parties—makes this “dark” rule “full[] of subtle difficulties”39 take 
slightly more coherent shape. There is evidence that courts are more likely to 
adopt a harder parol evidence rule when they have sophisticated parties before 
them and a more liberal parol evidence rule when they do not.40 Although courts 
are not necessarily always explicit or intentional about this two-track parol evi-
dence rule, a fragmented doctrine helps to explain case results that are otherwise 
practically inconsistent.41 
At times, however, courts make more deliberate efforts to pick a doctrinal rule 
to privilege a certain transaction type. For instance, New York42 explicitly 
adopted a strict parol evidence rule, precisely because it sought to orient its law to 
“promote and preserve New York’s status as a commercial center and to maintain 
predictability for” sophisticated parties in their contract and commercial law.43 In 
some ways, New York tries—imperfectly but self-consciously at times—to cre-
ate the very “law merchant for our time” for which Schwartz and Scott advo-
cate.44 This is at least some evidence that contract law sometimes takes itself to 
provide specialized legal regimes for sophisticated parties. Moreover, the 
American Law Institute’s effort to create a new Restatement for consumer 
36. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 633 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961). 
37. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573–95 (rev. ed. 1960). 
38. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, at 343–44. Some states are more consistent than others— 
but even within relatively consistent states there is variation. 
39. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 390 (1898). 
40. See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 
17 (1972); Michael A. Lawrence, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the Law of Contract, 
Revisited, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1072. 
41. See Childres & Spitz, supra note 40, at 7–8, 17; Lawrence, supra note 40, at 1072. 
42. See W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (N.Y. 1990). 
43. IRB-Brasil Resseguros v. Inepar Invs., 20 N.Y.3d 310, 315–16 (N.Y. 2012). For some of the 
historical evidence that New York has been pursuing this goal, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST 
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 80–92 (2001). See also 
Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1023, 1046–48 (2009) (identifying formal doctrines of contract interpretation such as the parol 
evidence rule and the plain meaning rule as a way to give parties control of the court’s process of 
interpretation and meaning of terms, respectively). 
44. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 550. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in 
Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains 
Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2010); Geoffrey P. Miller & 
Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073 (2009). 
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contracts45 involves the articulation of a specialized legal regime for consumer 
transactions. Notably, that draft highlights that a softer parol evidence rule should 
apply when a court is evaluating whether a consumer form contract is integrated 
and thus whether to bar supplemental terms.46 
* * * 
This Part sought to introduce the idea of a fragmented or tracked framework of 
contract law, showing how courts and scholars have tried to parcel the doctrinal 
regimes of contract into, at least, a contract law for sophisticated parties and a 
contract law for consumers. But what if the multi-track model routinely breaks 
down in practice? What if regimes set up for one contract type routinely “creep” 
into other contract types? With porous boundaries, is there any real hope for 
clean, severable contract regimes which we can select among? If regimes are 
hard to differentiate, these tracking projects might be more challenging than often 
presumed, notwithstanding their intuitive appeal. Part II below offers a few case 
studies of what we are calling “contract creep.” 
II. CREEP STUDIES 
Against the backdrop of the attempted fragmentation of contract law in theory 
and in practice outlined in Part I, this Part presents a few examples of creep 
between transaction types. As the examples demonstrate, doctrinal creep happens 
as courts allow rules contoured for one transactional context to migrate to another 
context for which they are ill-suited. 
In our first example (section II.A), ancillary terms such as arbitration and fo-
rum selection provisions proliferate across transaction types, with courts treating 
them more or less uniformly, notwithstanding that such provisions impact the 
value of transactions for different parties differently.47 
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 
841 F. Supp. 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
Courts take a relatively 
uniform approach notwithstanding empirical evidence and judicial and scholarly 
recognition of the distinctive ways that these types of ancillary terms operate in 
different transactional contexts.48 Moving in the opposite direction, in our second 
example (section II.B), the widespread application of the interpretive principle of 
contra proferentem—the principle of construing contracts against their drafter— 
demonstrates creep from insurance law to general contract law. As such, a princi-
ple that emerged from a recognition of a distinct transaction type involving quali-
tatively differently situated parties has crept into courts’ approaches to contract 
interpretation in general. What these case studies have in common is that 
45. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2017). 
46. Id. § 8 reporters’ notes, at 93–96 (discussing case law supporting a “probative and not 
conclusive” rebuttable presumption of integration in consumer contracts with a merger clause). 
47. 
48. See Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (“acknowledging that commercial and consumer contracts 
are different and should be interpreted differently”). 
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specialized and fragmented contract law veers off-track into general contract law. 
The urge to harmonize in the face of fragmentary design seems remarkably 
powerful. 
A. CREEPING FROM THE LAW OF SOPHISTICATED PARTIES INTO GENERAL CONTRACT 
LAW 
Ancillary contract terms typically govern secondary aspects of a deal rather 
than the primary transactional details such as product, service, quantity, and 
price. Often, ancillary terms are relegated to the margins of a contract and can be 
embedded as boilerplate or standardized provisions. Notwithstanding their sec-
ondary role and their relative inconspicuousness for some, ancillary terms can 
impact transactions in significant ways. Indeed, they can serve as valuable tools 
for sophisticated parties to shape their agreements. At the same time, they may 
prove particularly challenging for individual consumers to assess. Below, we 
offer case studies of two types of ancillary terms: arbitration provisions, which es-
tablish that parties agree to submit all or certain disputes to arbitration rather than 
judicial review,49 and forum selection provisions, which designate the court and 
location in which disputes arising out of the agreement must be litigated.50 
As these terms proliferate across transaction types, courts tend to treat them 
uniformly, notwithstanding the distinctive ways in which they reflect parties’ 
goals and intentions in different transactional contexts. The discussion that fol-
lows traces the doctrinal treatment of these provisions to illustrate the ways in 
which the doctrine creeps from sophisticated party and commercial contexts into 
consumer contexts in which the rationale and treatment in the commercial con-
text proves inapposite. 
1. Arbitration Clauses
The proliferation of arbitration provisions in recent years has been well docu-
mented.51 
See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the 
Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/ 
dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://nyti.ms/1kkstih] (identifying 
arbitration in the consumer context as prone to the leveraging of power by repeat players); Jessica Silver- 
Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration- 
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://nyti.ms/1KMvBJg].  
The prevalence of arbitration provisions has in turn prompted concern 
from scholars and journalists because of the risk that the enforcement of these 
terms might derogate from average consumers’ ability to hold companies  
49. Domke on Commercial Arbitration describes arbitration as “a process by which parties
voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person (an arbitrator) selected by them for a decision 
based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal.” 1 DOMKE ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1 (Larry E. Edmonson ed., 3d ed. 2009). 
50. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 253 (2018) (“A ‘forum selection’ provision in a contract
designates a particular state or court as the jurisdiction in which the parties will litigate disputes arising 
out of the contract and their contractual relationship.”). 
51. 
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accountable for misbehavior.52 Below, we briefly recount the trajectory of the 
enforceability of these provisions from a presumption against enforceability in 
the early twentieth century to legislative intervention establishing enforceability 
to the increasingly expansive presumption of enforceability in jurisprudence of 
late. 
Prior to the enactment in 1925 of what is now known as the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA),53 arbitration provisions had limited impact in practice.54 A reaction to 
federal courts’ resistance to arbitration provisions,55 the FAA altered what was 
viewed as an anachronistic presumption against enforceability.56 It did so by pro-
viding that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”57 The legislative history of the FAA indicates an intent to inter-
vene in merchant-to-merchant transactions,58 a transaction-type perspective that 
52. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 51; see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of 
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 
393–95 (2005); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory 
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740–42 (2006); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether 
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1136–37 (2006) (tracing the rise of binding pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in private contracts). A rich collection of scholarship has identified the harms and offers 
critiques of the presumptive enforceability of proliferating arbitration terms across transaction type. See, 
e.g., NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 121–22 (2013); MARGARET 
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Judith 
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the 
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2870–71 (2015). The scholarship has not, however, identified 
the enforceability of arbitration provisions as a piece of a larger story about the phenomenon of doctrinal 
creep. 
53. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (originally enacted as the United States Arbitration 
Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)). 
54. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (describing written arbitration agreements as “in large part 
ineffectual” as of 1924); see also David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363, 
377–99 (2018) (relaying the initially modest ambitions, structure, and increasingly broad interpretation 
of the FAA, including with respect to “arbitration about arbitration”). 
55. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 
8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 215 & n.14 (2000) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 24 (1991)). 
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . .”). 
57. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
58. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial 
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of Mr. W.H.H. Piatt, attorney, Piatt & Marks) (asserting that the FAA 
was not intended to “be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants 
the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if 
they want to do it”); see also J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3060 (2015) (explaining that FAA’s legislative history “indicates that the bill’s 
supporters likely . . . intend[ed] for it to cover . . . negotiated agreements between merchants”); David S. 
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an 
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 38 (asserting that in light of the legislative text and 
history, FAA was “not intended to apply to adhesive pre-dispute agreements”); Jean R. Sternlight, 
Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have 
Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 310–13 (1999) [hereinafter Sternlight, Compelling] (outlining FAA’s 
legislative history to indicate Congress’s focus on allowing “business entities to agree voluntarily to 
arbitrate . . . commercial disputes between them” with a concern that arbitration not be imposed via non- 
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can be seen in the Supreme Court’s approach to the FAA for a time. In the deca-
des following the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme Court viewed the statute 
with an eye to the distinctions between types of parties. The Court noted parties’ 
relative bargaining positions59 and suggested that arbitration provisions would 
not be enforced in adhesive consumer or employment contracts.60 
More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, has erased this doctrinal 
distinction.61 This, in turn, has encouraged the proliferation of arbitration provi-
sions across transaction types, which implicate bargaining power in markedly dis-
tinctive ways depending on the relative sophistication of parties.62 A rich 
literature has illuminated the failure of contract doctrine to account for ways in 
which individual parties to contract fall prey to cognitive errors.63 As many schol-
ars have observed, ancillary terms such as arbitration provisions present espe-
cially significant cognitive challenges for individual consumers, straining 
consumers’ ability to meaningfully assess the terms’ values and implications.64 
One assessment of rampant arbitration provisions put it this way: “under most 
reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is nonconsensual, given that con-
sumers and employees don’t typically read or understand the clauses.”65 
Arbitration provisions, unbeknownst to most consumers, threaten to deprive indi-
viduals of opportunities for redress from harm under the contract (whether it 
sounds in breach of contract or tort),66 as well as protections of federal statutory 
negotiable insurance or employment contracts of adhesion); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping] (noting 
concern in legislative history that arbitration would be “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive 
customers or employees,” and reassurances by supporters of the legislation that it was not intended to 
apply in such cases). 
59. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (“While a buyer and seller of securities, under 
some circumstances, may deal at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was 
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.”). 
60. See Glover, supra note 58, at 3060 & nn.31–33 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433–35, 437–38). As 
Glover notes, the Supreme Court was reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements that impacted federal 
statutory rights. Id. at 3060. 
61. See Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1637–38 (outlining Supreme Court’s post-Wilko 
course reversal beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century). 
62. See id. at 1631 (noting increasing use of arbitration provisions by U.S. companies in light of 
approval by the Supreme Court). 
63. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 211 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608 (1998). 
64. See Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 258; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217, 1225–27 (2003). For a summary of 
the challenges posed by arbitration provisions for individual consumers, see Tal Kastner, “I’m Just 
Some Guy”: Positing and Leveraging Legal Subjectivities in Consumer Contracts and the Global 
Market, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 531, 537–38 (2016). See also Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 
58, at 1648–52 (summarizing evidence of consumers’ limited contractual literacy and noting design 
tactics by companies to shift consumers’ focus, as well as repeat player and more subtle advantages that 
accrue to companies through mandating arbitration with consumers and employees). 
65. Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1649. 
66. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344, 352 (2011) (holding FAA preempts 
state law prohibiting contractual restriction of class-wide arbitration); see also id. at 365 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (indicating the potential implications of enforcement terms by outlining how a contractual 
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rights.67 More generally, the inability of consumers to weigh such provisions sug-
gests a market failure in the consumer context.68 In this light, many scholars argue 
for distinctive interpretive approaches to such terms rather than allowing the pre-
sumption of enforceability to bleed from the law of sophisticated parties into 
other contexts.69 
Yet, notwithstanding the difference in parties’ abilities to assess meaningfully 
and negotiate arbitration provisions and in the related differential impact of arbi-
tration provisions across contractual contexts, Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
moved away from distinguishing on the basis of transaction type. In this case, 
creep has been driven from the top down, beginning with the Court upholding a 
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in the form of the FAA.70 
Thereafter, the Court enforced arbitration provisions against consumers bringing 
antitrust claims,71 investors making securities laws claims,72 and employees 
claiming violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes.73 It then expanded the 
FAA to presume all claims arbitrable unless Congress expressly provides other-
wise.74 These developments have contributed to the proliferation of arbitration 
provisions in transactions across contract types.75 
Recently, one judge marveled at the incongruous application of the FAA to 
online consumer contracts, not least because of the nature of the transaction. Here  
restriction on class actions precludes the pursuit of meritorious claims); RADIN, supra note 52, at 5–8, 
33–34 (describing firms’ “mass-market boilerplate” as “withdraw[ing] a number of important recipients’ 
rights—such as rights of redress granted by the state, or user rights that are free of owner control under 
intellectual property regimes”). 
67. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061. 
68. Behavioral economics scholarship has identified the “imperfectly rational” response of 
consumers to contracts and the ways drafters of consumer contracts mobilize contract design to 
capitalize on consumer psychology. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 2 (2012) 
(identifying a market failure that results from contract design); see also Yannis Bakos, Florencia 
Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) (identifying a systemic failure of consumers to 
read end-user license agreement terms resulting from high reading and comprehension costs); David A. 
Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1595, 1640–42 (2016) (discussing how firms can shape individuals’ understanding of the meaning of 
their contracts contrary to their legal import). 
69. See, e.g., Gilson et. al, supra note 2, at 76 (“[W]e propose separating consumer contracts from the 
standard common law rules of interpretation designed for commercial parties by first acknowledging 
that commercial and consumer contracts are different and should be interpreted differently.”). 
70. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
71. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1985). 
72. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481, 486 (1989). 
73. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29, 35 (1991). 
74. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98–101 (2012). 
75. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061; Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1631. As Glover notes, 
arbitration agreements need not be signed to be enforceable, enabling the proliferation of terms through 
a range of written forms. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061 n.39. Parties may become bound to arbitration 
provisions by smartphone software applications (apps) that provide notice of agreement generally along 
with access to terms. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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is Judge Jed Rakoff on a mandatory arbitration provision linked via an app in a 
case involving a putative class action against Uber alleging illegal price fixing by 
the platform: 
Since the late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the United States and 
the constitutions or laws of the several states have guaranteed U.S. citizens the 
right to a jury trial. This most precious and fundamental right can be waived 
only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, with the courts “indulg[ing] every 
reasonable presumption against waiver.” . . . But in the world of the Internet, 
ordinary consumers are deemed to have regularly waived this right, and, 
indeed, to have given up their access to the courts altogether, because they sup-
posedly agreed to lengthy “terms and conditions” that they had no realistic 
power to negotiate or contest and often were not even aware of. 
This legal fiction is . . . justified . . . by reference to the “liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration” . . . . Application of this policy to the Internet is 
said to inhere in the Federal Arbitration Act, as if the Congress that enacted 
that Act in 1925 remotely contemplated the vicissitudes of the World Wide 
Web. Nevertheless, in this brave new world, consumers are routinely forced 
to . . . submit . . . to arbitration, on the theory that they have voluntarily 
agreed to do so in response to endless, turgid, often impenetrable sets of 
terms and conditions, to which, by pressing a button, they have indicated 
their agreement.76 
Judge Rakoff here identifies the distinct landscape of consumer contracting in 
which the presumptive enforceability of such provisions operates differently than 
the paradigmatic “voluntary agreement” of sophisticated parties, upon which the 
pre-internet FAA focused.   
76. Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated sub nom. Meyer v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Granting a motion by 
Airbnb to compel arbitration of a claim of racial discrimination on behalf of a class, district Judge 
Cooper acknowledged the distinct consumer context and its impact on parties formally agreeing to 
such terms: 
All of us who have signed up for an online service recently will recall the experience. 
After entering the service provider’s website, we were presented with a “sign up” or “create 
account” button prominently displayed on the screen. Next to the button—less prominent, 
no doubt—was the ubiquitous advisory that, by signing up, we would be accepting the pro-
vider’s “terms of service.” Perhaps there was a separate check-box prompting us to indicate 
our agreement to those terms. Regardless, eager to begin using the service and realizing that 
the provider’s contractual terms are non-negotiable, most of us signed up without bothering 
to click the accompanying link to reveal the contractual terms. Those who did undoubtedly 
found numerous pages of legalese. The intrepid few who actually read all the terms almost 
certainly learned that one of them requires users to relinquish their right to have a jury 
resolve any dispute with the provider. And that another bars class actions. This experience 
[is] shared by countless people each day.  
Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016). 
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2. Forum Selection Clauses 
Forum selection clauses—contractual provisions that designate the court and 
location in which disputes arising out of an agreement will be litigated77—aim to 
establish personal jurisdiction and venue to minimize costs and uncertainty.78 In 
particular, by including a forum selection provision, parties may limit costs by 
contractually protecting against litigation in a distant forum, as well as limit the 
costs of uncertainty about where claims will be brought.79 Contractual designa-
tion of forum also enables parties to anticipate litigation costs and negotiate terms 
accordingly.80 In this way, a forum selection provision operates as a discrete but 
sophisticated tool to choose favorable legal regimes and allocate and mitigate 
future costs.81 Underlying current receptivity to the enforceability of forum selec-
tion clauses is a presumption of the parties’ ability to choose. Thus, the nature of 
the implications of forum choice,82 and the trend toward its acceptance precipi-
tated by the demands of international transactions, indicate its divergent opera-
tion across transactional contexts. 
Enforceability of these clauses emerged historically in connection with the 
question of the rights of corporate entities. As courts appreciated the value to par-
ties of voluntarily establishing personal jurisdiction and venue, they grew com-
fortable with this kind of forum shopping.83 But this appreciation in the first 
77. See supra note 50. 
78. See David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 
785, 785 (1993) (describing the forum selection clause as a tool “allowing a party to limit its expenses of 
defending a lawsuit in a distant forum” by “determining in advance where litigation should take place”). 
79. See id. 
80. See id. 
81. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 70 (describing some of the useful purposes of including 
a “choice-of-court” provision). For an analysis and critique of the interpretive rules applied to forum 
selection clauses framed in terms of data concerning “contracts between and among business entities,” 
see John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Boilerplate Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2019). 
82. The argument that a competitive market protects consumers from opportunistic behavior by the 
drafter–seller may be inapposite in the case of forum selection provisions. The current lack of salience 
of the terms for consumers and consumers’ lack of understanding of the implications of forum selection 
provisions, in tandem with the operation of forum selection in limiting venues for redress, make it 
unlikely that competition and reputational concerns will limit sellers’ enforcement of the term. See 
O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 136; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided 
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 834 (2006) (demonstrating the 
incentives for businesses to waive enforcement for reputational ends with the example of a hotel check- 
out rule). 
83. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451–53 (1874) (voiding an agreement by an out- 
of-state corporation to forgo removal to federal court in recognition of a corporation’s rights as a 
citizen). The historical treatment of forum selection provisions as counter to public policy originally 
stemmed from the view that they inappropriately served to “close the access to” courts of their 
jurisdiction, “divest courts of their established jurisdictions,” and deprive a party of substantial rights. 
Id. at 451–53 (“A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights [or] bind 
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all 
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented. . . . [T]he principles mentioned . . . 
show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and 
void.”). By the 1970s, the Supreme Court dismissed the policy concern of “‘oust[ing]’ a court of 
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instance involved sophisticated parties; the potential impact on parties who lack 
the sophistication to assess the value, costs, and implications of such terms 
remained troubling to courts for a time. 
Notwithstanding some state law exceptions to the prevailing rule of presump-
tive enforceability,84 forum selection provisions have become commonplace. 
They appear in contracts such as asset purchase agreements,85 credit agree-
ments,86 and Google’s terms of service87
Google: Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/terms/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4H8E-GTTP] (last modified Oct. 25, 2017). 
—and can have significant implications 
for parties, both in terms of cost savings as well as issues related to access to jus-
tice and redress.88 They operate as sophisticated cost-mitigating provisions that 
also implicate significant substantive rights in ways that are difficult to assess, 
and which may not be evident to an untrained eye.89 As with arbitration provi-
sions, the extent to which forum selection provisions reflect the intentions of the 
parties depends on the type of contract in which the terms appear. Because of the 
potentially significant implications of a forum selection provision, some argue for 
different default rules and interpretations in differing transactional contexts.90 
The history of the doctrinal acceptance of forum selection offers one more 
example of the phenomenon of creep from similarly situated negotiating parties 
to general contract law. Against the backdrop of a long-held presumption against 
jurisdiction” as a “vestigial legal fiction” that predates the operation of businesses in world markets. The 
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). 
84. Some states statutorily void certain forum selection provisions. See Nat’l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. 
SysLOCATE, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322–23 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d, 433 Fed. Appx. 842 (11th 
Cir. 2011); Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Others treat 
them as non-binding but consider them a factor in determining the exercise of jurisdiction. See Holiday 
Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 1995). 
85. See, e.g., ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT - SUMMIT AMUSEMENT & DISTRIBUTING LTD, 
GAMETECH INTERNATIONAL INC - AUGUST 30, 2006 (2006); AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO ASSET PURCHASE 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION AND COMCAST CORPORATION, 
EXHIBIT 2.1 (2005). 
86. See, e.g., REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT - ALTRIA GROUP INC, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA 
AND OTHERS APRIL 15, 2005 (2005). 
87. 
88. See RADIN, supra note 52, at 4–6. For an analysis of the development of procedural term 
innovations, explaining the prevalence of some procedural terms and not others, see generally David A. 
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389. 
89. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1225–27 (identifying the cognitive limitations that hamper 
individuals from accurately assessing forum selection provisions among other ancillary contract terms). 
Some have questioned the distinction between access to local litigation and other contract terms. See, 
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 
(advocating presumptive enforceability of forum selection provisions across contract types when 
seeking a uniform approach to contract). In addition to seeking a rule that “performs . . . across the full 
range of cases,” this economic argument for presumptive enforceability presupposes parties’ abilities to 
value the term and a competitive market. See id. at 2, 7 (questioning why local litigation should be 
privileged “so long as price and other terms can vary to offset the risk in question”). For a discussion of 
the difficulties individual consumers face in assessing such risk in practice, see Korobkin, supra note 64. 
90. See KIM, supra note 52, at 121–22; RADIN, supra note 52, at 6; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. 
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 601–02 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting a distinction between the 
enforceability of a forum selection provision in a standardized passenger ticket and a “freely negotiated 
international agreement between two large corporations”). 
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the enforceability of forum selection clauses,91 in the latter half of the twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court shifted its position in light of the realities of sophisti-
cated transacting.92 In doing so, the Court identified forum selection provisions as 
a potent tool for informed parties in transactions involving “arm’s-length negotia-
tion by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.”93 Yet both the portable na-
ture of the term and the portability of doctrine have reinforced the blurring of 
contractual categories. 
In The Bremen v. Zapata,94 the Court held enforceable a forum selection clause 
in a heavily negotiated contract between corporate entities. The case involved an 
American corporate owner of an “ocean-going, self-elevating drilling rig” that 
contracted with a German corporation to tow the rig through international 
waters.95 The rig, damaged in a storm, was towed to Florida, where the owner, 
Zapata, brought suit in contravention of the contractual provision requiring the 
parties to litigate in English courts.96 The Court held the forum-selection clause 
presumptively enforceable in the absence of a showing that enforcement would 
be unreasonable, unfair, or unjust.97 The Court did so with an eye to the specific 
nature of the transaction—a dispute arising out of an “American company with 
special expertise contracting with a foreign company to tow a complex machine 
thousands of miles across seas and oceans.”98 Acknowledging “the expansion of 
overseas commercial activities by business enterprises,” the Court explained the 
negative impact the traditional doctrine would have upon “the future develop-
ment of international commercial dealings by Americans,” not least its potential 
to hinder the “expansion of American business and industry.”99 As such, the 
91. See Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause 
Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 426–32 (1991) (discussing “courts’ historical 
antipathy to forum-selection clauses”); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of 
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 293–94 (1988) 
(describing ability of parties to determine the forum as “a wholesale abandonment of a 100-year taboo 
against party autonomy”); Taylor, supra note 78, at 785–86; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“[A]greements in 
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”); Carbon Black 
Exp., Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 335 (W. Va. 2009) (“[F]orum-selection clauses 
historically were disfavored . . . .”); cf. Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345 
(3d Cir. 1966) (establishing deference to contractually-stipulated forum under Pennsylvania law in the 
absence of proof that it would unreasonably disadvantage one party thereby subverting interests of 
justice in case involving two corporate entities). 
92. For a brief discussion of the shift toward judicial acceptance of forum selection provisions in 
light of growing dockets, acceptance of the doctrine of forum non conviens, and forum shopping by 
parties, see Jennifer Dempsey, Forum Selection Clauses in Attorney-Client Agreements: The 
Exploitation of Bargaining Power, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1195, 1199–1200 (2012). 
93. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12. 
94. See id. 
95. Id. at 2. 
96. See id. at 3–4. 
97. See id. at 15. 
98. Id. at 8–9. 
99. Id. 
2019] CONTRACT CREEP 1295 
Court identified the treatment of forum selection clauses as prima facie valid 
absent a showing they are unreasonable as “the correct doctrine to be followed by 
federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”100 
In Bremen, the Court grounded its rationale for presumptive enforcement of fo-
rum selection provisions in the context of a “freely negotiated private interna-
tional agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or over weening 
bargaining power.”101 It noted, among other things, the “elimination of all . . .
uncertainties [as to the jurisdiction in which a dispute could be litigated] by agree-
ing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties [as] an indispensable ele-
ment in international trade,” “strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital 
part of the agreement,” which likely figured into negotiations and pricing,102 as 
well as the sophistication of both parties and the negotiated nature of the deal.103 
Indeed, the Court explicitly distinguished this case from one in which “[t]he 
remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one” 
and noted the lack of evidence that litigation in London would prove so costly as 
to deprive Zapata of its day in court.104 Thus, the Court’s rationale and framing 
highlight the operation of the provision in the context of a transaction involving 
highly sophisticated parties, while revealing concerns about adhesion contracts 
that might adopt such terms.105 
Although scholars note that “later cases could have limited Bremen to its com-
pelling commercial facts,”106 the Supreme Court took less than two decades to 
move away from the transactional boundaries suggested in Bremen in a now- 
familiar textbook case: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.107 It did so even as it 
highlighted transactional objectives as the basis of its rationale.108 This case 
involved a cruise ticket provided to a passenger following payment that directed 
the passenger to contract terms, which included a forum-selection provision. 
Holding the provision enforceable, the Court rejected the appellate court’s effort 
to distinguish the case from Bremen based on the non-negotiable instrument at 
issue.109 Instead, pointing to the cost savings to the drafter and the potential for 
savings to be passed along to the consumer as the relevant rationale for 
100. Id. at 10. 
101. Id. at 12. 
102. Id. at 13–14 (“[I]t would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their 
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring 
prominently in their calculations.”). 
103. See id. at 14 (citing favorably the characterization of the agreement as “freely entered into 
between two competent parties”). 
104. Id. at 17–18. 
105. Indeed, the Court’s presentation of facts suggests the contract terms were part of a bidding 
process for the deal as a whole, pursuant to which terms were reviewed and revised. See id. at 2–3. 
106. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 71. 
107. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
108. Id. at 593. 
109. Id. 591–93. Considering an appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invoked this distinction suggested by the circumstances in Bremen. 
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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enforcement,110 the Court crept away from the distinct-contract-type implications 
of the precedent on which it relied even as it invoked a transactional rationale.111 
In light of the Court’s holding in Carnival Cruise, the burden on an unsophisti-
cated plaintiff to overcome the presumption of enforceability remains high.112 
Notwithstanding the doctrine’s intellectual foundation in The Bremen, and its ba-
sis in transaction-sensitive reasoning, courts have explicitly rejected the position 
that “unequal bargaining power is a ground to reject enforcement of a forum 
selection clause in an employment contract.”113 
The trends in prevailing doctrinal approaches to forum selection and arbitration 
clauses—resistance, then limited enforceability as a law of sophisticated parties, 
then presumptive enforcement by courts across transactional contexts—illustrate 
a prototypical way creep can function. Describing the modern approach taken by 
“most courts around the country” to ancillary terms in “online adhesion con-
tracts,” one district court judge pointed to the one-size-fits-all perspective: the 
“basic inquiry as to enforceability boils down to basic contract theory of notice 
and informed assent with respect to the terms in question.”114 Courts insist on 
110. See id. at 593–94. 
111. Justice Stevens challenged this conceptual move in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 597–98 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the cruise line can reduce its litigation costs, and therefore its 
liability insurance premiums, by forcing this choice on its passengers does not, in my opinion, suffice to 
render the provision reasonable.”). Justice Stevens also took issue with the Court’s suggestion that the 
passenger was “fully and fairly notified about the existence of the choice of forum clause in the fine print 
on the back of the ticket,” especially considering that the terms were not provided prior to purchase. 
Id. at 597. 
112. The majority opinion in Carnival articulated exceptions to the presumptive reasonableness of a 
forum selection clause, which have been applied by courts to recognize fraud, deprivation of a day in 
court, fundamental unfairness, and the contravention of public policy of the forum state. See id. at 595; 
Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Co., No. 97-2185, 1998 WL 756893, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998) (citing 
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595) (“A choice of forum provision may be found unreasonable if 
(1) its formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the complaining party ‘will for all practical 
purposes be deprived of his day in court’ because of the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the 
selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; 
or (4) its enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.” (citation omitted)). 
Nonetheless, the burden remains high and is met when cases involve circumstances beyond an 
imbalance of power. Dempsey, supra note 92, at 1203–04. For example, in the employment context, in 
Sudduth v. Occidental Peruana, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Tex. 1999), the court acknowledged the 
distinction between a sophisticated party agreement as in Bremen, on one hand, and one involving an 
individual and corporation. The case involved a contract for work to be performed in Peru, which was 
written in Spanish and stipulated Peru as the forum for adjudication of any disputes. Id. at 694. The court 
pointed to the fact that the employee was forced to sign a contract in a foreign language as well as the 
asymmetrically burdensome requirement that the plaintiff travel to Peru in refusing to enforce the 
provision. Id. at 695. 
113. Marcotte v. Micros Sys., Inc., No. C 14-01372 LB, 2014 WL 4477349, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
11, 2014) (“[A] forum clause is not unreasonable merely because of the parties’ unequal bargaining 
power . . . .”). 
114. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *5 (D. Mass. 
July 11, 2016). Reversing the district court’s granting of a motion to compel arbitration in light of the 
company’s failure to establish that the term was conspicuous, the First Circuit Court of Appeals 
nonetheless reiterated the principle that there is “no reason to apply different legal principles [of contract 
enforcement] simply because a . . . clause . . . is contained in an online contract.” Cullinane v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 612 
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constructive notice, and at times also require an indication of assent in online con-
sumer contracts. As the adoption of formalities of assent in the consumer context 
demonstrates, the distinction between contract types no longer impacts the pre-
sumptive enforceability of such provisions.115 
B. CREEPING FROM CONSUMER LAW TO GENERAL CONTRACT LAW: CONTRA 
PROFERENTEM 
Contra proferentem is an admittedly old principle of contract construction that 
may have already been in the domain of “general contract law” since Roman 
times.116 Yet in its modern form, the doctrine seems to have migrated from a “first 
principle of insurance law”117 to modern general contract law. It requires constru-
ing ambiguous contracts against those who draft them. Here is a canonical state-
ment of the rule and its rationale in the insurance law context from the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals: 
[T]he contra proferentem rule[] is followed in all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia, and with good reason. Insurance policies are almost always drafted 
by specialists employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters’ expertise and 
experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth any limitations on its 
liability clearly enough for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do 
this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it 
could have prevented with greater diligence.118 
Or consider one more, from a state appellate court: 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2013)); Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 611–12, aff’d, 84 N.E.3d 766 (Mass. 2017) 
(“[F]ollowing the modern rule of reasonableness articulated in Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., we 
have held that such clauses will be enforced provided they have been reasonably communicated and 
accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue. . . . 
We see no reason to apply different legal principles simply because a forum selection or limitations 
clause is contained in an online contract.” (citation omitted)). 
115. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002); Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d 
at 611. 
116. For some recent work on contra proferentem (including its long history), see Michelle E. 
Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006) 
[hereinafter Boardman, Contra Proferentem]; Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance 
Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2013) [Boardman, Penalty Default Rules]; David Horton, Flipping the 
Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431 (2009); Ethan J. 
Leib & Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L. 
REV. 773 (2015); McCunn, supra note 13. For older treatments, see John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra 
Proferentem in the Government Contract Interpretation Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 381 (1980); 
David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1849–53 (1988); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: 
Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 254 
(1995). 
117. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 531 
(1996); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 37 (5th ed. 2010). But see 
Ed E. Duncan, The Demise of Contra Proferentem as the Primary Rule of Insurance Contract 
Interpretation in Ohio and Elsewhere, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1121 (2006). 
118. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted) 
(quoting Kunin v. Benefit Tr., Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
1298 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 107:1277 
Contra proferentem has a usual application. In the typical coverage contest 
between an insurer and its insured, ambiguous terms in the insurance policy 
are construed in favor of the insured. This rule of construction recognizes the 
disparity in bargaining power that typically exists between an insurer and an 
insured, particularly since insurance contracts are often contracts of 
adhesion.119 
The rule has a long history in contract law,120 but the conventional story of the 
doctrine as a core of insurance law which, in turn, gave courts further comfort 
with more applications of the doctrine outside insurance law, is widely 
accepted.121 Indeed, the most recent historical work on the doctrine seems to con-
firm that the doctrine as a matter of general contract law was essentially moribund 
until its revivification within the insurance contract context, where its justification 
made more sense to courts.122 
Courts and contract theorists have offered a variety of rationales for contra 
proferentem that extend beyond the narrow insurance context. For example, the 
dominant explanation of the rule is that it encourages clarity and discourages am-
biguity: if drafters can reliably expect contracts to be construed against them, 
they will draft clearer contracts.123 Although the benefit anyone could reasonably 
expect in a consumer context for clearer contracts is probably overstated (because 
no one reads their contracts anyway),124 this rationale is not targeted to explain 
the doctrine within any particularized transactional context, as it could apply to 
sophisticated parties as well. Ostensibly, everyone could benefit from clearer con-
tracts (though many sophisticated parties probably draft ambiguously to give 
themselves room to adjust over time as they see how things play out). Yet this 
dominant explanation seems secondary to a more directly pro-consumer rationale 
in the insurance context: the doctrine serves to protect the public against institu-
tions that are inclined to draft obscure contracts to entrap consumers. Unlike the  
119. Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2013) (citations omitted). 
120. The lengthy version of the narrative is told by Horton, supra note 116, at 438–46. But Horton 
confirms its cohesiveness principally as an insurance contract doctrine in the common law by the “last 
half of the nineteenth century.” Id. at 440. 
121. See Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 780 n.50. 
122. See McCunn, supra note 13. 
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. A (1981); Abraham, supra note 117, at 
533; cf. Horton, supra note 116, at 433 (discussing conventional explanations); Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2005) (“The doctrine of 
contra proferentem may still be a sensible tiebreaker, on the ground that the party who drafted the 
contract was probably in the better position to avoid ambiguities. But this is not always the case.”); 
Rappaport, supra note 116, at 178–87 (discussing formulations of the ambiguity rule in insurance law). 
124. See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone 
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2014); 
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 1 
(2009). 
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more basic generalized justification for clearer contracts, in the insurance context 
the most plausible justification is more particularized to consumer contracting.125 
And yet a recent study126 of the doctrine by one of us found it applying to a 
wide-ranging set of contracts outside the insurance context, including in employ-
ment,127 marriage settlements,128 stock certificates;129 money market docu- 
ments;130 co-op apartment agreements;131 property leases;132 landlord-tenant 
disputes;133 property sales using form agreements;134 and lawyers’ letters.135 
This caselaw—and many states’ pattern jury instructions136—underscore that 
contra proferetem is not a doctrine limited to insurance contracts, but has much 
wider application in the general law of contract. Courts sometimes find the rule 
especially important in the take-it-or-leave-it context of standard form contract-
ing,137 but the rule has crept back outward and is not a specialized interpretive 
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. A (1981); Posner, supra note 123, at 
1590 (“The second of these tie-breaking rules, contra proferentem, is conventionally defended on the 
ground that the drafting party may be able to pull a fast one on the other party, a defense that fails when 
the other party is commercially sophisticated.”). To be fair, the justification for contra proferentem that 
is now in vogue among the law-and-econ set is that insurance companies themselves want clarity and 
uniformity in the interpretation of their standardized provisions—and that clarity is especially important 
in insurance—so insurers benefit from this rule, which helps courts sustain such clarity and uniformity. 
See, e.g., Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 116; Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra note 
116; Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457 (2017). Still, 
we assume insurance companies would be delighted to do away with the rule—which is calibrated to 
work to their disadvantage—and because contra proferentem can be designed in many states to be 
applied by fact-finders rather than judges, see Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 784, it is hard to see the 
doctrine as very likely to produce consistent and uniform interpretations in the courts in actual practice. 
126. The findings cited here are drawn from Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 778–80. 
127. Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1097 (Alaska 2009); Abrams v. Horizon 
Corp., 669 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983); Int’l Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 538 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000). 
128. Hussein-Scott v. Scott, 298 P.3d 179, 183 (Alaska 2013) (holding that although Alaska law 
disfavors contra proferentem in marriage settlements, it is a tool of interpretation under Florida law); 
McMullin v. McMullin, 338 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Ky. Ct, App. 2001) (applying the rule to a marriage 
settlement agreement). 
129. Kaiser Alum. Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 399 (Del. 1996). 
130. Craig v. Hastings State Bank, 380 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Neb. 1986). 
131. 1901 Wyo. Ave. Coop. Ass’n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 463 (D.C. 1975); see also Highland Lakes 
Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 122, 892 A.2d 646, 660 (N.J. 2006) (Wallace, J., dissenting) 
(suggesting that ambiguities should be construed against drafters of bylaws of a country club). 
132. Kutkowski v. Princeville Prince Golf Course, LLC, 300 P.3d 1009, 1019 (Haw. 2013); Berg v. 
Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 233–34 (Wash. 1990); Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 736 N.E.2d 145, 
154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
133. Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010). 
134. DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 985 N.E.2d 1187, 1195–96 (Mass. 2013). 
135. Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 573 (N.Y. 1989). 
136. The pattern jury instructions in many states are cited and discussed in Leib & Thel, supra note 
116, at 779–80. 
137. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966) (“These principles of interpretation 
of insurance contracts have found new and vivid restatement in the doctrine of the adhesion contract.”); 
Anderson v. Baker, 641 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Mont. 1982) (same); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E. 
2d 424, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]mbiguous contracts (particularly contracts of adhesion) are 
construed against the drafter.”); Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905–06 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) 
(highlighting the rule’s central importance in cases of adhesion contracts); Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. 
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regime only for unsophisticated consumers. Although some courts speculate 
whether it makes sense to give sophisticated parties the benefit of the rule at 
all,138 the doctrine more or less will apply to any written agreement between any 
parties where there was no joint drafting effort.139 This creep disables theorists 
and courts from providing a satisfying unitary account of the doctrine, which was 
revived from near-death for one purpose, but is put to others too. 
This case study is useful both to illustrate creep that occurs from seemingly 
specialized interpretive regimes designed to help consumers back into the stream 
of general contract law—and to demonstrate how underlying policies, values, 
and doctrines can morph as the creep occurs. In the case of contra proferentem, 
the insurance law versions of the rule were much more aggressive efforts to con-
strue contracts against issuers early in the interpretive process.140 Parallel to the 
creep, however, the doctrine itself was thinned out to serve as a last resort tie-
breaker,141 an instantiation of the doctrine that neither promotes clear policies nor 
helps consumers as often as it was probably designed to. This kind of patchwork 
is expected when interpretive regimes cannot sustain their boundaries—and 
Connell, 786 N.W.2d at 25 (noting that the rule is particularly applicable in standardized contracts); see 
also Judicial Council of Cal. Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 320 Interpretation—Construction 
Against Drafter (2016) (“This . . . rule is applied with particular force in the case of adhesion contracts.” 
(quoting Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998))); 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & 
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:28 (2014) (“[T]he contra proferentem rule and 
adhesion contract analysis have historically been inextricably bound.”). 
138. See Joyner, 361 S.E.2d at 905–06 (rejecting the application of the rule “where the parties were 
at arms length and were equally sophisticated”); see generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the 
Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003) (identifying a trend of 
sophisticated party insureds being excepted from contra proferentem in courts, but arguing that it still 
makes sense in many cases to apply the doctrine even to insured sophisticated parties). 
139. See Morgan Stanley v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2000) (deciding that 
the linchpin was that the insured—Morgan Stanley—did not negotiate its terms and therefore it did not 
matter that Morgan Stanley is by all measures a sophisticated party); see also Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. 
Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 521 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is not merely 
whether the insured is a sophisticated corporate entity, but rather whether the insurance contract is 
negotiated, jointly drafted or drafted by the insured.”); FabArc Steel Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr. 
Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 359–60 (Ala. 2005) (focusing on the “arm’s length negotiations” as the reason 
not to apply contra proferentem); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993) (focusing on whether the contract was jointly negotiated rather than focusing only on 
“sophistication”). 
140. See, e.g., J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss. 
1998); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So.2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994); Williams v. Life Ins. Co. 
of Ga., 367 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. 1979); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with 
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 (1970) (suggesting that ambiguity may not be a seriously 
enforced threshold for applying the rule). 
141. See Hurd v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (“At best it is a secondary 
rule of interpretation, a ‘last resort’ which may be invoked after all of the ordinary interpretative guides 
have been exhausted.”); see also Kaiser Alum. Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 399 (Del. 1996); 
Moore v. Lomas Mortg. USA, 796 F. Supp. 300, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773 
N.W.2d 564, 570 (Mich. 2009); cf. Fisher v. Cmty. Banks of Colo., Inc., 300 P.3d 565, 569 (Colo. App. 
2010) (describing the doctrine as one of several “‘secondary’ guides” to resolve remaining ambiguities 
after the “primary” interpretive rules have been applied); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 
reporter’s note cmt. A (“[O]ne may doubt that the rule is ‘the last one to be resorted to, and never to be 
applied except when other rules of interpretation fail.’” (citation omitted)). 
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contra proferentem illustrates that dynamic well, even if it is not a perfect exam-
ple of a purely specialized regime because of its early etiology as pervading more 
general contract law.142 
* * * 
Our case studies here are only that: examples of a common phenomenon that 
implicate some costs and risks of the unintended consequences of setting up frag-
mented regimes for contract law. Nothing we say here requires that this impulse 
for harmonization of fragmented contract regimes always obtains—or that it is 
always inappropriate.143 Indeed, this dynamic is just what one would expect of 
the common law, but heretofore few have trained their eyes on the risks creep can 
cause. A fuller inquiry would identify a few contexts in which creep has been per-
fectly well contained—where the law sustains its own fragmentation moderately 
successfully. Although there has been much harmonization between the Uniform 
Commercial Code’s treatment of sales of goods and the modern common law of 
contract, there remain a few specialized rules where fragmentation has been suc-
cessful, if much criticized. For example, the common law of contract continues 
to impose the “preexisting duty rule,” whereas modifications under the UCC’s 
§ 2-209(1) are permitted without consideration as long as they are made in good 
faith.144 We could develop other examples, too.145 But that fragmentation is 
142. Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 81–86, tell a similar kind of story about the “reasonable 
expectations” doctrine, which also crept outward from insurance law. They find that as it crept, it lost its 
way—and courts had a hard time gerrymandering it to new purposes just as they failed to keep it focused 
on its old purpose. For more on the doctrine, see Leib, supra note 31. 
143. We acknowledge this supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
144. See, e.g., Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and Its 
Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 445–53 (1996). 
145. Consider, for example, the well-entrenched fragmentation within insurance law between the 
interpretive principles that apply to first-party insurance contracts (when a policyholder buys a policy to 
protect her property against damage or accidents, say) and third-party insurance contracts (when a 
policyholder buys a policy to protect against her liability to a third party for her own conduct). See Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N. J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he parties to each 
form of insurance contract assume vastly different roles. In the third-party setting, the insurer and 
insured may generally be considered allies, but in the first-party context, the insured and carrier are 
placed in an adversarial position. We are persuaded that the time-honored distinction between the two 
types of insurance coverage is valid and should be maintained.”); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Mt. Vernon Fire 
Ins. Co., 708 N.E.2d 167, 170 (N.Y. 1999) (“[W]holly different interests are protected by first-party 
coverage and third-party coverage.”); Winding Hills Condo. Ass’n v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 752 
A.2d 837, 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (sustaining the doctrinal distinction between the 
“continuous trigger rule” for third-party claims and the “manifest trigger rule” for first-party claims). 
Ultimately, courts tend to pursue “solicitousness for victims of mass toxic torts” in establishing readings 
of, and rules for, third-party coverage, but are willing to apply stricter rules that do not vindicate “public 
rights” when construing first-party coverage. Id. 
Yet notwithstanding the “time-honored” separate tracks of first-party and third-party policies—which 
pursue different values—Chaim Saiman argues persuasively that the development of “bad faith” law in 
insurance (when an insurer fails to settle or pay a claim in bad faith) actually jumped from the third- 
party to the first-party context without much resistance. See Chaim Saiman, The Restatement of Law of 
Liability Insurance and the Creation of Insurance Law (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11–13). 
Whether that is because both tracks of insurance law were just becoming harmonized with general 
contract law is hard to say without deeper study. 
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sometimes successful does not inspire confidence that it can always be,146 such 
that we can forget its risks—and too often courts and theorists fail to understand 
the dynamics of fragmentation. In Part III below, we start to explore some of the 
determinants and causes of creep to help isolate how it happens. Only then can 
we get a handle on more easily stopping it in the contexts where we should be 
especially cautious about law falling off track. 
III. WHAT’S CAUSING CREEP? 
In the preceding Part we identified creep from commercial settings and highly 
negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties into the realm of consumer 
contract. We also demonstrated creep from a specialized interpretive regime of 
insurance doctrine back into wide application in the general law of contract, 
where it first appeared and then was revivified. More generally, these examples 
underscore the difficulty at times of bracketing specialized areas of law, even in 
areas recognized as discrete transactional types, such as insurance. As the discus-
sion above suggests, although these “creeping” doctrines may not have necessar-
ily disavowed the possibility of broader application, each emerges with a 
rationale grounded in a particular transactional structure that creeps into applica-
tions in different transaction types. In this Part, we focus on some of the mecha-
nisms and structural aspects of contract that contribute to creep. 
We offer below three explanations of how the process of creep can occur. 
First, we explore how the instability of party-status designations (is someone a so-
phisticated party or a consumer or both?) pushes courts away from clean frag-
mentation of contract regimes. Second, we observe how modularity, portability, 
and innovation in contract design makes possible the migration of doctrine and 
terms, which themselves end up carrying doctrine with them. And finally, we 
146. Another area of contract law that sustains doctrinal distinctions but, at times, nonetheless creeps 
back and forth is that of commercial and residential leases—and their fragmentation from general 
contract law and from each other. Although, as one court asserts, “[i]t is almost axiomatic that 
commercial leases may and should be governed by a different rule than residential leases,” 29 Holding 
Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), the migration of rationales and categories 
can be seen in the history of the doctrine. In the nineteenth century in New York, a landlord had no duty 
to mitigate damages by trying to re-rent a property abandoned by the original tenant. Becar v. Flues, 64 
N.Y. 518 (1876); see also 29 Holding Corp. 775 N.Y. at 810 (identifying Becar as a “seminal case in this 
area”). In the telling of one court, the rule that landlords had no duty to mitigate in the context of 
commercial or residential leases reflected “common law principles . . . in recognition of property rules 
from feudal times.” Rubin v. Dondysh, 549 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989), rev’d, 588 N.Y. 
S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Term 1991). More recently, some courts asserted that “there is no longer good 
reason—if there ever was—why leases should be governed by rules different from those applying to 
contracts in general,” including an obligation by the non-breaching party to mitigate any loss following 
a breach. Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974). And yet, other 
courts continue to find no duty to mitigate in commercial leases, whether as an invocation of the original 
principle or as a recognition of the nature of “business transactions.” Holy Props. Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth 
Cole Prods., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1995). Moreover, still other courts have used the principle of 
the distinctiveness of lease agreements in the commercial lease context to reestablish the lack of a duty 
to mitigate in the residential context. See Rios v. Carrillo, 861 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) 
(finding that “[a]lthough Holy Props. involved a commercial lease . . . [t]here is simply no basis for 
limiting the broad language of Holy Props” and thus applying its reasoning to a residential lease). 
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show how migrating metaphors and conventional analogical reasoning in the 
common law of contract can cause creep. This is not an exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive list of how creep happens; there may be other dynamics in play—and, 
as we show, interaction effects among our mechanisms. But viewed together, 
these mechanisms reflect competing tendencies in contract law: a tendency to-
ward general principles of contract as a default position in the law as well as an 
enduring context sensitivity, which is not consistently circumscribed. 
A. CATEGORY INSTABILITY 
It is not a secret that the terms “sophisticated parties” and “consumers” are not 
self-defining. Schwartz and Scott define sophisticated parties to include corporate 
entities with at least five employees.147 Goldberg defines sophisticated party 
transactions as “agreements for which both parties could be expected to have 
access to counsel.”148 These definitions—which are not adopted as law by any ju-
risdiction that purports to have a law for sophisticated parties—are probably 
adequate for theorizing. They also show that some scholars grapple with the prob-
lem. They fall shy, however, of being a reliable basis for legal implementation. In 
a world of small businesses and multinational corporations, with a range of mer-
chants and business entities in between, it is easy to conjure a host of transactions 
involving significant differentials in power or substantive sophistication that 
might fall within these very categories. 
Thus, for example, compare two contracts: (1) a transaction between a gift 
shop owned by a retired teacher who incorporates it as a limited liability com-
pany, employing herself and four others, and a provider of garbage pick-up serv-
ices that operates on a statewide level, on one hand; and (2) a transaction between 
two multinational corporations, on the other hand. Should contra proferentem 
apply the same way in both transactions? Should we enforce non-negotiable boil-
erplate terms in both contexts? Should courts treat similarly the presence or ab-
sence of a term identifying both parties as drafters in both contexts? Although 
Schwartz and Scott’s “sophisticated party” categorization offers a neat bright 
line, it also presumes that courts will and ought to treat such potentially dissimilar 
transactions similarly across the board.149As these examples suggest,150 however, 
there will be a significant range in the extent to which “[t]hese economic entities 
can be expected to understand how to make business contracts.”151 And this is the 
real substantive reason Schwartz and Scott want to have a sophisticated party cat-
egory in the first place. Small businesses are likely to face challenges stemming 
from limits of resources and access to information to say nothing of cognitive 
147. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45. 
148. GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 1. 
149. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544 (suggesting a category of sophisticated parties 
including “(1) an entity that is organized in the corporate form and that has five or more employees, (2) a 
limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm”). 
150. These examples involve slight changes to those offered by Schwartz and Scott to illustrate their 
proposed contract categories. See id. 
151. Id. 
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biases, which more experienced or powerful firms might avoid.152 It is thus easy 
to see both why it makes substantive sense to have a tracked or fragmented con-
tract law and also that the challenges for line-drawing are patent, making the 
tracks routinely unstable. 
Access to counsel similarly proves a capacious category in a world in which 
lawyers range from sole practitioners, on one hand, to white-shoe global firms, on 
the other, with a host of legal practices and levels of sophistication and client 
service in between. As a result of its inclusiveness, Goldberg’s access-to-counsel 
test, like the simple sophisticated party model outlined by Schwartz and Scott, 
risks oversimplifying the very transactional distinctions it aims to address. 
Moreover, highlighting the fuzziness of the boundaries these tests offer, the two 
approaches do not produce coterminous results. They would treat differently, for 
example, an individual employee who negotiated her employment contract terms 
and had a friend who was a lawyer review the agreement between her and the 
employer, a publicly traded software company.153 For Goldberg, that is a sophisti-
cated party transaction, but not for Scott and Schwartz. 
In practice, courts do not prove insensitive to the dimensions of transactional 
context that these examples suggest. Instead, courts sometimes attempt the very 
context sensitivity demanded by a fragmented contract law. However, in doing 
so, they contend with the instability of the categories that ought to guide the 
tracking of contract type, leading to creep. 
This dynamic is on display in our contra proferentem case study. Although the 
rule seemed largely to be a pro-consumer interpretive principle within the insur-
ance context, eventually courts were faced with whether to give the “benefit” of 
the rule to sophisticated parties who did not have a hand in negotiating their form 
contracts with vendors, providers, and insurers. Although courts and commenta-
tors sometimes presume that there is a “sophisticated policyholder” exemption 
from contra proferentem,154 the weight of the evidence points to co-drafting and 
joint negotiation, rather than “sophistication,” however defined, as the central cri-
teria for the non-application of contra proferentem.155 
See Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 781–82 (“But just having a sophisticated nondrafting party 
isn’t enough to form a general exception to the rule. The crux seems to be actual negotiation, 
deliberation, and dickering over terms.” (footnote omitted)). Because contra proferentem does not 
reflect the preference of at least some sophisticated parties, corporate transactional documents, such as 
credit, purchase, or merger agreements, can include a standardized term stating that the parties “have 
participated jointly in the negotiation and drafting” of the agreement, and: 
Thus, even when the 
152. Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 522 (citing Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False 
Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 304–68 (2005)). Miller notes as well that 
this categorization implicitly relies on size and entity formation as determining factors of sophistication, 
an approach that caselaw does not follow. Id. 
153. See Am. Software v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding contract 
enforceable as “the result of an arm’s-length negotiation between two sophisticated and experienced 
parties”). 
154. See, e.g., Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 504; Jeffery W. Stempel, Reassessing the 
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993). 
155. 
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https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/793952/00007939521 
8000012/hog-12312017xexhibit416.htm [https://perma.cc/322M-B6TJ]. Considering the phenomenon 
of creep and the tendency for courts to impose contra proferentem, we can only speculate about the 
force of this provision in the face of evidence of drafting by one party and of the possibility of the 
provision migrating into transactions beyond those drafted by global corporate law firms. In any event, 
lots of searching on the central contract database Onecle does not suggest contra proferentem “opt-outs” 
are actually common for sophisticated parties and agreements. 
consumer is a corporate entity rather than an unsophisticated individual, the rule 
holds against the drafter.156 
Perhaps seeing sophisticated parties as capable of being consumers in some 
transactions precipitated the process we call creep, enabling judges to again 
expand the application of contra proferentem outside the narrow insurance con-
text to other transactions. Courts are still not completely indifferent to the bar-
gaining power or status of the parties.157 But they have largely given up sharply 
differentiated contract regimes for purposes of contra proferentem, at least in part 
because the categories that serve as the thresholds for a relevant track themselves 
prove porous. 
The fluidity between sophisticated parties and consumers also gives rise to an 
example of creep within our forum selection clause case study. In a 2012 case 
involving an individual Facebook user’s challenge to the enforceability of a 
In the event an ambiguity or question of intent or interpretation arises, [the] Agreement . . . 
shall be construed as if drafted jointly by the parties . . . and no presumption or burden of 
proof shall arise favoring or disfavoring any party by virtue of the authorship of any provi-
sions of [the] Agreement . . . .  
Exhibit 4.16: 364–Day Credit Agreement Among Harley–Davidson, Inc. et al., JPMorgan Chase Bank, 
N.A., et al., SEC (May 1, 2017), 
156. See, e.g., Minn. Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Tr. v. Emps. Ins., 331 F.3d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he 
Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the rule in disputes between parties apparently having equal 
bargaining power.”); Morgan Stanley v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]here 
is no general rule in New York denying sophisticated businesses the benefit of contra proferentem.”); St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1092 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting 
argument that contra proferentem “should not apply to the Defendants because they are large, 
sophisticated companies”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1219 (Ill. 
1992) (holding that “any insured, whether large and sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with 
the insurer which is written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. Generally, since little or 
no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the terms and the drafting of the 
contract,” so contra proferentem should apply) (citations omitted); CPS Chem. Co., v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 
536 A.2d 311, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (“These principles are no less applicable merely 
because the insured is itself a corporate giant. The critical fact remains that the ambiguity was caused by 
language selected by the insurer.”); 2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:24 (3d ed. 2015) 
(“Avoidance of the rule . . . is not required merely because an insured party is a business rather than an 
individual.”). 
157. See Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d 646, 660 (N.J. 2006) 
(stating that the rule should be especially favored in case of parties with unequal “bargaining power”); 
Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010) (suggesting that a “stronger 
bargaining position” by the drafting party is a reason to favor an interpretation against the drafter); 
Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905–06 (N.C. Ct. App.1987) (declining to apply the rule where 
“parties were at arms length” and “equally sophisticated” and stating it is “usually” reserved for those 
“where one party is in a stronger bargaining position”); Seligson, Morris & Neuburger v. Fairbanks 
Whitney Corp., 257 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (considering it a strike against application 
of the rule where those “who participated in the making of the written agreement were sophisticated 
persons with extensive business, and some with legal, training”). 
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forum selection provision in a case alleging discrimination against him for his 
Muslim identity, a federal district court pointed to the user’s internet sophistica-
tion as the basis for determining that the threshold issue of notice had been estab-
lished.158 Considering whether Facebook’s “Terms of Use” were reasonably 
communicated to the user, the court distinguished the case from those involving 
“sophisticated commercial entities,” and identified the user as a “consumer.”159 
However, the court invoked the user’s relative social networking sophistication 
in determining that the terms were reasonably communicated and therefore en-
forceable. The court asserted, “it is not too much to expect that an internet user 
whose social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly 
caused him mental anguish would understand” that a “Terms of Use” hyperlink 
allows access to terms.160 Underscoring the relevance of the user’s internet 
sophistication, the opinion in Fteja suggests particular considerations prompted 
by this transaction type. The court allowed that, “to many people,” unlike for the 
user, “[t]he mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar.”161 
The court thereby identifies a particular category, that of internet or social 
media sophistication. It emphasizes, “for those to whom the internet is in an indis-
pensable part of daily life, clicking the hyperlinked phrase is the twenty-first cen-
tury equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket,” thereby referencing Carnival 
Cruise.162 The court essentially creates a hybrid category of sophisticated con-
sumer. Whether this reflects a creep of sophisticated party categorization into the 
consumer context, or of consumer contracts toward the realm of sophisticated 
party contract doctrine, this example demonstrates the difficulty judges at times 
face in maintaining sharp boundaries between transaction types. Paradoxically, 
the cause of this difficulty appears to be judges’ awareness of the implications of 
context. As much as they try to be sensitive to context, judges can, as in this case, 
find themselves participating in doctrinal creep as categories get hybridized. 
Two more recent cases further complicate the hybrid category of sophisticated 
internet consumer. In doing so, they demonstrate the struggle courts face catego-
rizing new developments in transactional practices—and how they foreseeably 
lead to creep. 
In Berkson v. Gogo LLC, federal district Judge Jack B. Weinstein asserted that 
“internet consumers” “require clearer notice than do traditional retail buyers.”163 
Holding the terms of use embedded in the webpage of in-flight wifi provider 
Gogo unenforceable in 2015, Judge Weinstein pointed to the consumer’s  
158. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
159. Id. at 836 (distinguishing enforceability of online “browsewrap” terms of use based on whether 
they are being imposed on corporations or individual consumers). 
160. Id. at 839. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting defendant’s claim of adequate notice of 
automatic renewal term, mandatory arbitration provision, and waiver of venue in online terms of use). 
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“one shotter” status, as opposed to the offeror’s “repeat player” position.164 In 
this light, he placed the burden of “the duty to explain the relevance of the critical 
terms” on the offeror.165 Undertaking an extended “assess[ment]” of the “attrib-
utes of the average internet user,”166 the doctrinal landscape,167 as well as of 
forms of online notification and assent,168 the opinion considers both the transac-
tion type and the nature of the parties in the specific circumstance of online con-
tracting.169 In doing so, the opinion presents online contracting by a consumer for 
a product as a special type of transaction, which prompts a particular interpretive 
posture by the judge.170 
A subsequent case the next year, Salameno v. Gogo Inc.,171 complicates this 
analysis by presenting another hybrid category similar to the “sophisticated 
internet user” invoked in Fteja. In Salameno, airline passengers using the Gogo 
in-flight wifi service challenged the enforceability of terms, which were commu-
nicated, as they were in Berkson, in the form of a so-called “sign-in-wrap agree-
ment.”172 Though the facts in Salameno hew closely to those in Berkson,173 Judge 
Weinstein distinguished the cases, emphasizing that the users in Salameno were 
“not unsophisticated lay internet users.”174 Instead, holding the terms enforceable, 
the opinion characterized the Salameno plaintiffs as “[s]ophisticated business 
travelers who repeatedly purchased and used Gogo’s product.”175 According to 
the opinion, these individuals “can be assumed to have been aware of the 
164. Id. at 382–83 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974)). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 377–83. In a fifty-four page opinion containing an involved overview of current literature 
on internet use, the court identifies the “lack of empirical evidence concerning actual notice” of “the 
average internet user.” Id. at 380. 
167. Id. at 383–94. 
168. Id. at 394–402. 
169. See id. at 403–04 (“Proof of special know-how based on the background of the potential buyer 
or adequate warning of adverse terms by the design of the agreement page or pages should be required 
before adverse terms, such as compelled arbitration or forced venue, are enforced.”). Focusing on the 
category of “sign-in-wraps,” in which notice of terms occurs via the sign-in process to a site, id. at 389, 
the court presents a four-part inquiry to determine enforceability. Id. at 402. Criticizing the approach in 
Berkson, a federal district court in Massachusetts declined to follow the likely “fact intensive analysis,” 
hewing instead to a formal test of reasonable notice. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750- 
DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016). In Cullinane, the court turned back to a 
general contract approach in which “enforceability turns more on customary and established principles 
of contract law,” id. at *6, defaulting to the undifferentiated take on arbitration discussed in Part II 
supra. 
170. See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 403–05 (contrasting the case with the “contract scenario in 
Carnival Cruise” and weighing the level of awareness of the terms of the deal of the particular 
consumer). 
171. No. 16-CV-0487, 2016 WL 4005783, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016). 
172. Id.; see also Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 399–401. 
173. See Erin Canino, Note, The Electronic “Sign-in-Wrap” Contract: Issues of Notice and Assent, 
the Average Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 569 (2016) 
(“At first glance the Salameno case appears to mirror Berkson almost exactly . . . .”). 
174. Salameno, 2016 WL 4005783, at *6. 
175. Id. at *1. 
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arbitration clause where they repeatedly ordered the service.”176 Constructing a 
category of “practiced individuals,” the judge opined, “[i]n today’s technologi-
cally driven society, it is reasonable to charge experienced users . . . with knowl-
edge of . . . how to access the terms of use.”177 
Salameno thus presents another fragmented categorization, a consumer 
deemed “sophisticated business traveler.” As with Berkson, this approach demon-
strates the inclination by judges to account, at times, for subtleties of relational 
and transactional distinctions. A somewhat paradoxical result of this sensitivity 
to context, it proves hard for the court to maintain stable boundaries between 
party types in their doctrinal elaborations, pushing doctrine toward a generalizing 
tendency. The blurring of party and transaction types thereby complicates the 
project of recognizing distinct transactional spheres that a fragmented contract 
law approach envisions—and on which it is premised. 
The common designation of attorneys as sophisticated parties serves as one more 
illustration of the hybridity and fluidity of categorization that threatens fragmented 
regimes because creep pushes towards generalization. Courts have deemed lawyers 
sophisticated parties even in cases in which they function as consumers acceding to 
non-negotiable online terms.178 In other contexts, courts have taken a more gran-
ular view to consider a lawyer’s expertise when determining whether he qualifies 
as a “sophisticated” party.179 Courts have also invoked the lawyer versus non- 
lawyer distinction as a benchmark to establish a non-sophisticated party transac-
tion. Thus, for example, in Meyer v. Kalanick in 2016,180 a federal district court 
drew on the distinction between lawyer and consumer to hold that a user of 
Uber’s smartphone application was not bound by terms embedded in a hyperlink 
under the registration button. In doing so, the court characterized the plaintiff as 
a “reasonable (non-lawyer) smartphone user” who could thus not be assumed to 
be “aware of the likely contents of ‘Terms of Service.’”181 Although the district 
court’s holding in Meyer v. Kalanick was vacated on appeal,182 the Second 
Circuit’s application of general contract principles reflects the impact of creep. 
Following “precedent and basic principles of contract law,” the Court of 
Appeals identified the need to “consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent 
smartphone user” in determining the conspicuousness of notice of terms of serv-
ice.183 Thus, reacting in part to the confusion hybrid party types can sow, the 
Court of Appeals embraced a generalizing doctrine. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at *6. 
178. See Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 513–14 (discussing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F. 
Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007)). 
179. See Reilley v. Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994) (holding that a lawyer with no 
knowledge of real estate law could not be treated as a sophisticated party). 
180. 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated sub nom. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 
(2d Cir. 2017). 
181. Id. at 421. 
182. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 66. 
183. Id. at 77. 
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As we can see, both generalizing tendencies and the instinct to context sensitiv-
ity can move doctrine around among different transaction types, with an attendant 
risk that law gets applied in potentially ill-fitting ways. The harmonizer should al-
ready be considering the differential impact of one law on different kinds of trans-
actions and contracts among those with different relative party statuses. But those 
who want clean, cordoned off, and fragmented law too often fail to see how 
hybrid categories of contract on the margins can be sluiceways of creep, allowing 
law designed for one context with one values matrix to drift into an area of law 
with another. 
B. PORTABILITY 
Scholars have long acknowledged that the significance of contract terms can 
depend in part on the transactional context in which the terms are read.184 
However, features of contract drafting and enabling technologies potentially lib-
erate terms from their defining contexts, serving as another mechanism of creep. 
Indeed, scholars have begun to appreciate a feature of contract drafting that facili-
tates context independence of certain terms. To wit, the use of self-contained 
terms or sections that are portable among different transactional contexts—a pro-
cess made even more common through the use of modern technologies—makes 
these provisions less susceptible to the complications of context-dependent mean-
ing.185 Technologies of both research and drafting—freed from the contextual 
trappings of physical documents, treatises, or libraries—enable judges, clerks, 
and lawyers to find, borrow, and import terms independent of contextual markers. 
Modular design—by which a system is segmented into components “in which 
communications (or other interdependencies) are intense within the module but 
sparse and standardized across” them—enables the management of complex-
ity.186 It does so by reducing the degree to which a part interacts with the 
whole.187 Typically, contract drafting reflects some degree of modularity. 
Contracts are often constituted by relatively self-contained sections that can be 
revised, cut, or pasted without necessitating the rewriting of the entire document. 
A high degree of modularity can promote efficient drafting, negotiation, and com-
pliance and can reduce contracting and reading costs.188 As a result, modular 
design has been identified as a promising technique for contract innovation.189 At 
184. See Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 23 (identifying appropriate interpretive regimes based on a 
“typology of transactional settings”). 
185. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. 
REV. 1175, 1207 (2006) (“As long as the interface conditions are obeyed, one need not worry further 
about the context.”). 
186. Id. at 1176, 1180. 
187. See id. at 1180–86. 
188. See id. at 1184–85; see also Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking 
in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1420 (2016) (discussing the efficiencies 
of modular design through the use of ancillary contracts in complex deals). 
189. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and 
Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 202–06 (2013) (advocating modularity 
as an innovative contract design). 
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the same time, the increased context independence and portability of terms 
among transaction types enabled by more modular design also operates as a 
mechanism for creep. Modularity seems to invite and enable courts to treat like 
terms alike even when different transaction types might be better served by dif-
ferential interpretation and application. 
In particular, Henry Smith identifies as modular those provisions “typically . . .
found at the end of a contract” that address common issues “like assignment and 
delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries, governing law and 
forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, remedies, indemnities, force 
majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality, announcements and notices, amend-
ment and waiver, severability, merger, and captions.”190 Encapsulated in separate 
sections, these conventional contractual provisions prove particularly portable 
across transaction types.191 
The portability of these boilerplate provisions is apparent in their ubiquity.192 
Yet, notwithstanding the way they can be incorporated easily into a range of 
transactions, as discussed in Part II, ancillary contract terms, such as forum selec-
tion and arbitration provisions, do not have the same valence across contract 
types. Instead, empirical and behavioral studies suggest that the extent to which 
these ancillary terms reflect parties’ understanding, or are at all visible to parties, 
differs depending on the party and transaction type.193 Thus, for example, forum 
selection, arbitration, governing law, waiver of jury trial, and similar ancillary 
provisions that modify the framework for litigation and redress prove less salient 
for most individual consumers than they do for drafting companies or multina-
tional corporate entities.194 This suggests that, notwithstanding the efficiency of 
190. Smith, supra note 185, at 1191. Smith views these “boilerplate” terms as operating between the 
poles of bespoke contract terms and standardized property rights, as relatively discrete context- 
independent communication. See id. at 1176. 
191. See id. at 1197 (noting that commonplace recurring provisions are often “hived off into 
sections,” facilitating their portability and migration to different contexts). As Smith suggests using the 
example of a governing law provision: 
A boilerplate provision about governing law can be developed by those versed in choice of 
law without their having to know in detail about where the boilerplate provision will wind 
up—and without users of the boilerplate provision having to think through all of the possible 
scenarios involving choice of law. 
Id. at 1188. 
192. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 
UCLA L. REV. 605, 607 (2010) (“Studies find mandatory arbitration clauses and class arbitration 
waivers in over three-quarters of consumer agreements.”); Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1639– 
41 (acknowledging the prevalence of mandatory arbitration provisions); cf. Peter B. Rutledge & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After 
Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014) (explaining the slower-than-expected adoption of 
favorable-to-drafter arbitration provisions in standard consumer contracts in part as a result of the 
“stickiness” of standard form contracts). 
193. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 258; Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1225–27; see also 
Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1648 (“Empirical studies have shown that only a minute 
percentage of consumers read form agreements, and of these, only a smaller number understand what 
they read.”). 
194. See Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1230–31; see supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
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portability across different transactions, it would be too quick for interpreters to 
assume the provisions should mean the same thing across transaction type. Yet 
portability encourages this very effect. 
A fractured theory of contracts acknowledges that arbitration provisions in a 
negotiated agreement between transnational corporations, for example, reflect 
qualitatively different processes of assessment and agreement than the same pro-
vision in a consumer contract.195 However, lacking contextual markers, or spe-
cific “interfaces” that demonstrate a transaction-specific operation,196 highly 
modular provisions are often deemed to operate consistently across transactional 
contexts.197 The standardized treatment by courts of such ancillary provisions— 
once deemed presumptively unenforceable as against public policy in certain 
contexts198—demonstrates the challenge they pose for a fragmented framework 
of contract. The presence of similar terms, such as a forum selection clause, in 
distinct transactional contexts enables the possibility of creep, or the application 
of the same interpretive or doctrinal framework across transaction types. 
Thus, the relatively modular nature of contractual drafting and the related port-
ability of terms—increasingly facilitated by new technologies that enable quick 
drafting without a subtle sense of context sensitivity—operate to create condi-
tions for creep. Although a well-differentiated fragmented contract law would 
carefully train drafters to develop transaction-type-specific operation of terms, 
widespread modularity and portability will still create some difficulty for courts 
as they face identical terms in different transactional environments. Moreover, 
technologies of legal research, like those enabling a wide search for models, 
allow contextual frames to recede, further inviting courts, consciously or 
unknowingly, to appropriate doctrinal approaches from different transactional 
contexts. In short, contract drafting processes lend themselves to the implementa-
tion of modular design, and thus the creation of relatively context-independent 
provisions, which in turn enable creep. 
195. See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (noting that “commercial and consumer contracts . . . 
should be interpreted differently” when considering interpretive approaches to ancillary terms). 
196. See Smith, supra note 185, at 1207 (“As long as the interface conditions are obeyed, one need 
not worry further about the context.”). These interfaces could take the form of doctrinal tracks but, as 
discussed above, in contract law, those tracks may prove unstable. Interfaces could also conceivably be 
manifested as a term. See Klass, supra note 35, at 17–18 (discussing the benefits of a “short canonical 
form” indicating the parties’ intent to form an integrated agreement, for example, along the lines of 
other canonical formulas such as “F.O.B.” or “as is”). Depending on the particularities of both the text 
and context, these terms might themselves be susceptible to migration across transaction types and thus 
creep, as discussed in this Part. 
197. See supra Part II. 
198. For the presumption against forum selection provisions, see Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. The 
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959), which discusses 
the “universally accepted rule that agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.” Prior to the enactment 
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, arbitration provisions had limited impact in practice. See 
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). At the time of enactment, the effective unenforceability of arbitration provisions in 
transactions between merchants under the common law was considered anachronistic. See S. REP. NO. 
68-536, at 2 (1924). 
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C. ANALOGICAL REASONING 
In addition to the difficulty of maintaining stable categories of transaction 
types and the relatively modular structure of contract drafting, the predominant 
mode of legal reasoning by courts—the use of analogical reasoning—operates as 
another technology of creep. Discussing the challenges of legal classification in a 
now canonical article, Arthur Leff noted that because “there is no such thing as a 
thoroughly homogenous class . . . [a]ll classification decisions are . . . choices 
among metaphors.”199 As a fundamental feature of common law analysis, the pro-
cess of reasoning by analogy and the mobilization of metaphor in classifying 
transactions also contributes to creep. As Leff identified, one danger of classifica-
tion as an intellectual tool is the “problem of artificial class homogenization” in 
which certain functional differences are ignored.200 At the same time, the hetero-
geneity of any class demonstrates the potential porousness of boundaries. Indeed, 
the recognition that courts reason analogically across transaction types is at the 
heart of Scott and Schwartz’s line-drawing project and insight that different trans-
action types should precipitate distinct doctrinal regimes. 
As an illustration, the requirement that a party be notified of the existence of a 
term has become a doctrinal threshold in the enforcement of common ancillary 
provisions, such as forum selection and arbitration clauses.201 Yet this notice 
requirement can be understood to have crept from sophisticated party to con-
sumer contexts not only through a mixing and hybridizing of transaction type as 
we saw above, but also through metaphor and analogical reasoning. 
Consider a particularly developed explanatory metaphor that courts have been 
using to reinforce the importance of notice for ancillary terms.202 The metaphor 
first arose in a case about a transaction involving two business entities engaged in 
repeated exchanges. Verio, a website development firm, submitted requests for 
domain name registrant data to Register.com, an internet domain name regis-
trar.203 
Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Each purchase of data was followed by a notice of “terms of use” relayed 
to the purchaser via email.204 Assessing the second transaction in the series of 
exchanges in light of a claim that Verio violated the terms, Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals Judge Pierre Leval rejected the contention that Verio had failed to 
receive notice of terms so as to be bound.205 To explain the point, he offered the 
following analogy: 
199. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (1970). 
200. Id. at 136. 
201. See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
202. For an analysis of the significance of party types in light of the party’s status as a “repeat player” 
or “one-shotter,” see Galanter, supra note 164, at 97–104. 
203. 
204. Id. at 396. 
205. Id. at 402. For a discussion of this case in connection with courts’ invocation of a narrative of 
agreement, which muddies the distinction between the operation of different types of terms in different 
contexts, see Tal Kastner, How ‘Bout Them Apples?: The Power of Stories of Agreement in Consumer 
Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 67, 104–10 (2014). 
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The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P maintains a road-
side fruit stand displaying bins of apples. A visitor, defendant D, takes an apple 
and bites into it. As D turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to 
exit, which says “Apples—50 cents apiece.” D does not pay for the apple. D 
believes he has no obligation to pay because he had no notice when he bit into 
the apple that 50 cents was expected in return. D’s view is that he never agreed 
to pay for the apple. Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D revisits the 
stand, takes an apple, and eats it. D never leaves money.206 
Judge Leval explains the legal outcome in terms of “standard contract doc-
trine:”207 “when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree 
makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the 
taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms.”208 Thus, if “P sues D in contract 
for the price of the apples taken,” notwithstanding the possibility of prevailing on 
the initial apple, D’s defense that he did not see the notice of the price until after 
taking the apple the first time fails for the second apple.209 
In the context of a merchant-to-merchant transaction, the Second Circuit 
asserted that “[w]hile new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many 
new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”210 
The court rejected the purchaser’s argument that an online agreement must 
require an affirmative indication of assent to terms, recognizing the business-to- 
business context of the transaction.211 
Yet this doctrinal pronouncement, along with the metaphor, creeps by way of 
analogy into the realm of consumer contracting. In contrast to the transaction 
addressed by Judge Leval involving two merchants, the metaphor of the sign 
above the apple stand grounds a later district court’s explanation of why a con-
sumer had adequate notice of terms of use.212 Analogizing the apple stand to a 
case involving a forum selection clause embedded in Facebook’s Terms of 
Use,213 a district court expanded the metaphor so as to blur the distinction in 
transaction type. Explaining its holding enforcing a forum selection clause, the 
district court compared “[t]he situation . . . to one in which Facebook maintains a 
roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples. For purposes of this case, suppose 
that above the bins of apples are signs that say, ‘By picking up this apple, you 
consent to the terms of sales by this fruit stand. For those terms, turn over this 
sign.’”214 Thus, the expanded analogy of the fruit stand erases the distinction  
206. Register.com, 356 F.3d at 401. 
207. Id. at 403. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 401. 
210. Id. at 403. 
211. Id. 
212. See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
213. Id. 
214. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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between product terms in a merchant-to-merchant context and ancillary provi-
sions in a consumer contract.215 This case, Fteja, conjuring the category of so-
phisticated internet user, should be familiar by now: analogical reasoning works 
together with the fluidity of transaction types to facilitate creep there. 
Indeed, the expanded analogy serves to underscore the doctrinal formality of 
the notice requirement in subsequent applications of the rule in the consumer con-
text. In validating an arbitration clause in the Uber terms of use, one court reiter-
ated the analogy, reinforcing the way creep works through analogical reasoning. 
The court explained in Cullinane v. Uber Techs., “[i]n analyzing online agree-
ments, the Second Circuit has used the analogy of a roadside fruit stand display-
ing bins of apples; these apples have a sign above them displaying the price of the 
apples for potential consumers.”216 
Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7 (D. Mass. 
July 11, 2016) (emphasis added) (citing Register.com, 356 F.3d at 401). 
The court notes its agreement with the way 
this analogy has been “refined . . . further” to encompass the “terms of sales” on 
the back of the metaphoric sign.217 
Thus, as the metaphor evolves to include a back-of-the-sign notice of ancillary 
terms to a consumer in place of a pricing or product term in the context of a sophisti-
cated party transaction, it demonstrates the problem of “artificial class homogeniza-
tion” to which Leff referred.218 As such, notwithstanding the contextual distinctions 
among the cases—Verio is business-to-business; Fteja is sophisticated-consumer- 
to-business; and Cullinane is a plain-vanilla consumer transaction—the doctrinal 
approach to notice resists cabining by transaction type in part because of the ineluc-
table appeal of the apple stand analogy. The tendency for creep to occur as a func-
tion of the migration of metaphor proves unsurprising, especially in a common law 
regime where reasoning by analogy is a foundational tool. But sometimes it is worth 
policing analogies—as Scott and Schwartz’s project in principle suggests we do— 
so deliberately fragmented regimes don’t get too quickly and inappropriately 
assimilated. 
Creep happens through at least the three mechanisms we identify here: the flu-
idity of party status and transaction type; the portability of contract provisions; 
and the analogies that migrate among cases of different transaction types. 
Moreover, there are no doubt ways these mechanisms work not only alone but 
also in tandem with one another, colluding to make creep even more likely. We 
conclude in Part IV by drawing out a few lessons from contract creep. We do not 
think there are perfect solutions to some of the complexities of creep that frag-
mentation invites. However, more mindfulness and more deliberate effort to take 
stock of the dynamics of creep is warranted. 
215. See supra Part II for scholars’ identification of the ways ancillary terms differ from price and 
product terms and ways in which the individual consumer’s ability to assess such terms may differ from 
that of a merchant. 
216. 
217. Id. (citing Fteja, 841 F. Supp. at 839–40). 
218. Leff, supra note 199, at 136. 
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IV. LESSONS FROM CREEP 
Having now identified a phenomenon that many scholars who promote frag-
mentation avoid confronting—and having observed a few of the mechanisms in 
the common law of contract and contract drafting practices that contribute to 
creep—we conclude by summarizing our analysis and outlining its relevance for 
lawmakers, contract lawyers, and theorists. 
A. RECOGNIZING CREEP AND ITS COSTS 
Appreciating the porousness of transaction types and the way doctrines creep 
among them enables us to intervene in a robust conversation among contract the-
orists who wish to sustain plural objectives with plural contract law regimes. Our 
caution here that these regimes do not necessarily stay cordoned off from one 
another commits us neither to advocate for a unitary contract theory nor to reject 
the project of fragmentation. Indeed, we cannot contest that terms are agreed to 
differently in different transactional contexts, which may justify distinct doctrinal 
approaches and default rules. The tracked application of the parol evidence rule 
implicitly demonstrates courts’ intuitions concerning the need for a fragmented 
approach. More explicitly, scholars emphasize the need for a fragmented regime, 
whether in isolating a “sophisticated party” contract law or in a pursuit of prolif-
erations of categories of contract types. Both legal thinkers and courts thereby 
recognize that distinctions among parties’ sophistication, capacities, resources, 
and bargaining power impact and should impact the shaping of default rules and 
interpretive approaches. 
Yet the likelihood of creep directly implicates the project of creating bespoke 
doctrine for different transaction types. A rich field of study is dedicated to the de-
velopment of an optimal merchant law. For example, Schwartz and Scott, 
Goldberg, and others219 embrace this project, grounded in the notion that an effi-
cient framework—one attuned to the dynamic of transactions among “sophisti-
cated economic actors”220—should apply to sophisticated parties. Our work here 
has shown, however, that this project at least must take more seriously the ques-
tion of how to delineate the boundaries of the legal regime because there is a high 
likelihood that the optimal merchant law will bleed out and affect consumer 
transactions. To develop a program that defaults toward party preferences—a 
merchant law to “recover and then enforce the parties’ apparent intentions”221— 
scholars must give further thought to the ways in which transaction-type bounda-
ries can be stabilized and better delimited. 
Creep also poses a real challenge to the project of increasing the choices 
among distinct transactional realms. The goal of realizing autonomy through a 
proliferation of contract types that Dagan and Heller envision necessitates a 
219. See GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 1; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45. 
220. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45. 
221. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial 
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2017). 
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mitigation plan for creep. The cultivation of wide-ranging contract types to ena-
ble freedom of contract requires further study of the mechanisms that disrupt 
transaction-type boundaries. Most basically, creep introduces a cost that must be 
reckoned with in advancing a multiplicity of contract types. In addition, without 
addressing the operation of creep, projects such as Dagan and Heller’s may be 
doomed to undermine their own agenda because of creep’s power and robustness. 
In connection with other areas of law, such as property, scholars have identified 
“a limited number of standardized forms” of ownership.222 In doing so, scholars 
distinguish property law from the realm of contract in which “there is a poten-
tially infinite range of promises that the law will honor.”223 The phenomenon of 
creep suggests that further consideration is warranted as to whether there may be 
an “optimal standardization” of contract rights—and with it forms of contract.224 
With a shorter list, it might be easier to manage creep within the contract system. 
At the very least, creep introduces a cost that must be weighed in the calculus. 
Even if theory moves away from the proliferation of transaction type urged by 
the Dagan and Heller model, but tries instead to stick with just the sophisticated 
party category, there remains yet another challenge for theory. In defending the 
attention they give to a specialized regime for sophisticated parties, Schwartz and 
Scott assert that “as a descriptive matter, most commercial contracts affect only 
the parties to them.”225 Yet in light of what we now know about creep, the doc-
trines we make for sophisticated parties may still creep away from them and 
affect consumers, too. As such, a tracked approach to contract doctrine may need 
to reconsider disregarding interests of fairness and distribution in the develop-
ment of a sophisticated party contract regime that can leak elsewhere.226 
The more recent work of Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott 
acknowledges that “[t]he range of options for parties and generalist courts is 
much more diverse and variegated than the choice between ex ante party 
autonomy and ex post adjudication.”227 This work appreciates that complexity 
rather than prefab tracking is likely essential to getting interpretive questions 
right. As their analysis suggests, and our case studies do not contradict, “general-
ist judges applying general, mandatory legal doctrine cannot effectively deter-
mine the environments in which context matters.”228 Yet, to the extent that their 
analysis still requires bespoke legal doctrine to guide judges, our case studies 
222. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The 
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 8 (2000). 
223. Id. at 3. 
224. Cf. id. at 38–40 (discussing an optimal level of standardization in property rights); Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem 
and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 380 (2002) (“[T]he utility of standard contractual 
terms and forms is evidently not frustrated by the continuing availability of an infinite variety of 
nonstandard contractual rights with unconventional and perhaps hard-to-measure characteristics.”). 
225. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 555. 
226. Cf. id. at 545 (noting that requiring the law to “promote fairness in contracting” would “be 
troublesome for an efficiency approach that covered all contract types”). 
227. Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 23. 
228. Id. at 32. 
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suggest that they should not be so sanguine that such a goal is attainable without 
creep—and without the costs of creep resulting from the imposition of ill-fitting 
law to some transaction types. 
In short, the now widely shared insight that it would be desirable to have sepa-
rate contract regimes for sophisticated parties on the one hand and consumers on 
the other has an Achilles heel. Contract law and contract theory to date have 
failed to examine with sufficient care the ways that different tracks and frag-
mented regimes are susceptible to interaction effects. To design a tracked system 
properly, theorists and courts must first acknowledge the porous and unstable na-
ture of the tracks themselves, focusing as we have here on just how the lines get 
crossed. Creep—the migration of transaction-specific doctrine across transaction 
types—is a counterforce that will challenge efforts at fragmentation. 
B. RISKS AND COSTS OF STANDARDIZATION AND PORTABILITY 
Creep also complicates the existing cost–benefit analysis of modes of contract 
drafting and design. It is, in the final analysis, not just doctrine and theory that 
will have to contend with the risks and costs associated with creep but contract 
drafters and lawyers as well. 
Drafters routinely employ standardized terms and relatively modular design. 
The benefits of standardization and modularity for contract design have long 
been recognized. For example, standardized terms impart value through learning 
benefits and related network effects.229 The learning benefits that result from 
standardization or common usage of terms include drafting efficiency, lawyers’ 
and other professionals’ familiarity with the terms, and less uncertainty about a 
term’s meaning in light of judicial precedent.230 Network benefits emerge as 
more parties use the same term or product.231 Like the use of a term over time, the 
widespread use of a term raises the quality and lowers the costs of legal and pro-
fessional services, aids in the pricing of securities, and aids in the development of 
interpretive precedent.232 In addition, modular design is a promising technique 
for contract innovation because innovators can develop and improve a provision 
without having to modify other terms.233 Innovations, or significant improve-
ments to contracts beyond customization, can also be imported to other docu-
ments and become standardized themselves.234 
The portability of terms may, however, lead to costs because of creep. As we 
explained in Part III, the relatively modular design of contract documents and the 
process of drafting by pasting or modifying precedent, which facilitated and is 
229. See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate 
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (analyzing benefits that 
accrue as a result of standardization of terms). A classic example of a product with network benefits is 
the telephone. 
230. Id. at 719–20. 
231. Id. at 726. 
232. Id. 
233. Triantis, supra note 189, at 182. 
234. Id. at 184. 
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facilitated by standardization of terms, contribute to the problem of doctrinal 
regimes being applied to transaction types for which they were not designed. 
Furthering this process, the current technological environment supports the dis-
semination of terms. Internet technology has not only enabled broad sharing of 
terms, but has also “encouraged the recent formation of broadly constituted 
groups dedicated to setting contracting standards across, as well as within, indus-
tries.”235 Innovative deal structures will also draw on existing forms of both trans-
acting and documentation. Word-search based technologies further invite 
importation of terms and doctrine from one context to another. Conditions are 
thus ripe for the migration of terms across transaction types, which itself is likely 
to lead to ever more creep. An analysis of the benefits of standardization and 
of the design of portable terms must therefore also weigh the risks and costs of 
doctrinal creep that they enable and cause. 
Scholars have acknowledged some of the potential costs of standardization. 
For one, theorists have noted the “stickiness,” or tendency of standardized terms 
to resist change, as a potential obstacle to efficiency in contract drafting and inno-
vation.236 Standardization has also been shown to lead at times to “rote usage,” or 
the loss of shared meaning through overuse, as well as “encrustation,” or the ero-
sion of the intelligibility of a standard term as a result of the addition of legal jar-
gon over time.237 However, work has yet to be done on how creep, and the way 
standardization and modularity enable it, compounds the risks posed by the phe-
nomena of stickiness, rote usage, and encrustation. 
One set of legal developments that has prompted a wealth of scholarly dis-
cussion238 illustrates the costs of creep in a way that has not yet been 
acknowledged directly. Specifically, the idiosyncratic—and by all accounts, 
mistaken—interpretation by courts of the meaning of a boilerplate provision in 
the sovereign debt context demonstrates the interplay of creep, portability, and 
standardization. In the past few years, courts in Brussels and New York repeat-
edly interpreted a ubiquitous provision, the pari passu clause, to provide special  
235. Id. at 188. 
236. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 651, 651–52 (2006). Scholars have also identified the phenomenon of “stickiness” of default rules 
as a function of the difficulty of contracting around a term. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An 
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2086 (2012). This type of stickiness is at play 
in the case study of contra proferentem discussed in Part II, in which sophisticated parties cannot 
necessarily easily contract out of the default rule. 
237. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 5. 
238. The developments concerning the pari passu clause in sovereign debt have prompted a host of 
theoretical, empirical, and practical scholarship on contract design. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT 
E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT 
DESIGN (2013); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. 
Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 224, 224–38 (2017); Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 6; Stephen 
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation, 
20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2018); Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, 
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 72 (2013). 
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rights to holdout creditors of sovereign debt.239 They did so despite the fact that it 
was widely accepted that the clause had no operative meaning for sophisticated 
sovereign creditors.240 Indeed, prior to the decisions, the conventional wisdom 
among sophisticated investors was that their contracts did not give them a holdout 
right (to say nothing of the debt purchasers in the distressed secondary market).241 
The resulting costs of the mistaken interpretation—most notably, the triggering 
of the Republic of Argentina’s default on $29 billion of debt242
Kathy Gilsinan, 65 Words Just Caused Argentina’s $29-Billion Default, ATLANTIC (July 31, 
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/65-words-just-caused-argentinas-29- 
billion-default/375368/ [https://perma.cc/P6BN-PSWN].  
—resulted, in part, 
from the interplay between creep and standardized terms that migrated across 
transaction type. 
The pari passu provision, after all, entered the sovereign debt contract by 
“migrat[ing] from cross-border corporate documents” and being “copied by . . .
lawyers . . . who had not realized that such a clause was meaningless in the sov-
ereign context.”243 The “black hole” of meaning that resulted from the inclu-
sion of a standard provision provided the opportunity for exploitation by a 
“contractual arbitrageur.”244 Specifically, a holdout creditor took “advantage 
of a long-standing canon of contract construction,” the general contract pre-
sumption that all clauses have meaning.245 The creditor thereby leveraged and 
weaponized the possibilities for creep—a generalist contract doctrine in a par-
ticular transaction type—to invite an unintended interpretation. Thus, in addi-
tion to the danger of portability in its own right, the possibility of doctrinal 
creep exacerbates the risks of the relocation of standard terms. 
Standardized terms in homogenously sophisticated markets invite a particular 
doctrinal approach that recognizes the efficiency of communicating fixed and 
reliable meaning.246 In the case of pari passu in the sovereign debt context, how-
ever, courts implemented a generalist interpretive approach. Specifically, the 
239. See Joint Appendix at A-1356, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105(L)) for an English translation of the Brussels case first interpreting the pari passu 
clause in a Peruvian sovereign debt contract. See also Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 238, at 6 n.11 
(citing Joint Appendix, supra, at A-1356). For decisions affirming the same interpretation in a case 
against the Republic of Argentina, see NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d 
Cir. 2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. 2012); NML Capital, 
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-Civ.-6978(TPG), 2011 WL 9522565 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). See 
generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238. 
240. For a discussion of the recent interpretation of the pari passu provision in connection with first 
debt issued by the Republic of Peru and then by the Republic of Argentina, see Choi, Gulati & Scott, 
supra note 221, at 18–24. See also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 3, 51–52, 109–18 (discussing a 
lack of understanding of the meaning of the term by sovereign bond market participants). 
241. See id. 
242. 
243. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 14 (citing Lee C. Buchheit, Negative Pledge Clauses: The 
Games People Play, 9 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 10, 10 (1990)); see also Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, 
The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 875 (2004). 
244. Choi et al., supra note 221, at 72. 
245. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 14. 
246. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (explaining interpretive approach to “[b]oilerplate provisions,” in 
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courts treated the contract language as indicative of the intent of the particular 
parties thereto. In doing so, they failed to apply the parties’ ex ante preferred in-
terpretive framework, in which boilerplate is read to reflect the shared under-
standing of the market as a whole—another example of creep. Whereas the creep 
in this case may be viewed as one within the broad realm of sophisticated party 
transactions, it nonetheless illustrates the challenge of maintaining discrete tracks 
and bespoke doctrine, even when there is a significant degree of consensus in the 
markets and among scholars. 
As the pari passu cases illustrate, even in distinctive transaction markets, gen-
eralist courts and sophisticated parties remain vulnerable to creep. In addition, 
theoretical models of sophisticated party contracting have suggested that parties 
will revise terms to correct for mistaken interpretations.247 However, the case 
study of pari passu presents an example of the slow workings of the market to 
correct the court error—a “systemic problem that caused substantial costs.”248 
Evidence that the market may be slow to correct the mistake by courts as well as 
the identification of “black hole” terms in various standard markets,249 demon-
strates further potential costs of creep. The risk of creep must therefore also be 
included in evaluating the costs and benefits of the use of standardized terms in 
contract design. 
CONCLUSION 
In Duncan Kennedy’s famous article Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication, he identified two central dynamic forces that he thought would 
always make claims on contract law and shape it: individualism and altruism.250 
Although he argued that these are opposed to one another and have contradictory 
implications for regime design in contract law, he argued that people tend to be 
unable to rid themselves fully of either tendency. This leads to instability, indeter-
minacy, occasional incoherence, and tension within the law of contract. It may 
be that the urges of fragmentation and harmonization—like individualism and 
altruism—also form an ineluctable dialectic. Both forces have pull on us when 
we are faced with complexity. We all hold both instincts at once: we want both 
more specific contract types and more generality in our contract law at the same 
time. Creep may be the way we mediate between them, as we lay down tracks for 
particularized contexts, only to see law developed in one track find itself relevant 
and harmonized for another.   
light of view that they are “not the consequence of the relationship of particular borrowers and lenders 
and do not depend upon particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture”). 
247. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 5. 
248. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 2. 
249. See id. at 71 (pointing to the “number of recent papers exploring similar problems in other 
standard markets”). 
250. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 
1685 (1976). 
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Yet for those who advocate for different forms of fragmentation and particu-
larity in contract law, it seems high time to pay more careful attention to the 
way creep tends to leave specialized law susceptible to affecting law well out-
side it—and susceptible to being made impure from outside. Something less 
than purity might need to be the goal considering the reality of creep. That 
means lawmakers, lawyers, and theorists have to account for the risks and the 
costs of creep as they design their modalities of fragmentation in our increas-
ingly complex economy. Further study will hopefully reveal how best to design 
regimes of contract that both have structural integrity and develop through 
analogy only when appropriate.  
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